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Public policy is the result of strategic interactions between political actors. 
In this dissertation, we study different manifestations of such political 
influence. In the first chapter, we focus on influence within political 
organizations, analyzing the determinants of the balance of power between 
a party leader and party backbenchers (i.e., party discipline). The model 
formalizes the tradeoff between resources at the leader’s discretion, and 
her need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading. We 
show that offers of publicly observable, irreversible payments on the spot 
increase the value of promises of future partisan benefits such as 
nomination to party lists. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom,   xv
these promises are insufficient to grant significant power to the party 
leader. In the second chapter, we focus on influence between branches of 
government. In particular, we examine empirically the political incentives 
faced by individual justices of the Argentinean Supreme Court. While 
Argentina’s constitution and electoral rules promote a fragmented polity, 
most analysts do not consider the Argentina judiciary as independent. We 
show that this perception is inappropriate. Our results show an often 
defiant court subject to constraints, behaving strategically. The 
probability of voting against the government falls the stronger the control 
of the president over the legislature, but increases the less aligned the 
justice is with the President. In the third chapter, we focus on the 
influence of interest groups on public policy. We link the theory of interest 
groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control 
over the judiciary, and .study the implications of separation of powers for 
the existence and effectiveness of lobbying by interest groups.  The 
resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with 
the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative 
outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-
of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be 
sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more 
divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework 
to analyze Supreme Court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results 
consistent with the predictions of the theory.   1
Chapter 1 
Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline 
and Vote Buying in Legislatures 
 
1.1  Introduction 
    One of the central questions in the study of representative democracy is 
how partisan organizations shape decision-making in legislatures. At the 
core of this matter is the balance of power between party leaders and 
rank-and-file party legislators (backbenchers, or PBs). Under what 
conditions will a party leader be able to induce her party to support an 
unpopular position? Conversely, when will party leaders have to back 
away to the views of a majority of the party? 
    In this paper, we provide a simple model to tackle these questions. In 
particular, we reexamine within the model the conventional wisdom in 
political science that leadership’s promises of future benefits (such as 
nomination to party lists) are the key instruments through which a party 
leader can induce backbenchers to support the party line, possibly even 
against their preferences.
1 This ability of the party leader to change 
                                                 
1 “The assumption here is simply that nomination control is a key determinant of an 
agent’s unity because leaders who possess this power should be able to discipline their 
followers.” (Morgenstern 2004); “The nature of the nominating procedure determines the 
nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party” 
(Schattschneider, 1942; p.64). For similar arguments, see, among many others, Ames 
2002, Bowler, Farrel and Katz 1999, and Sanchez de Dios 1999.The role of nomination   2
backbenchers’ voting behavior away from their ideal voting pattern is 
typically referred to as party discipline  (see Krehbiel, 1993; Cox and 
McCubbins, 1993; Tsebelis, 1995). 
    The model in this paper formalizes the tradeoff between resources at 
the leader’s discretion, and the inherently contestable nature of the 
leadership in political parties. On the one hand, the party leader is 
endowed with two types of resources with which to influence legislators’ 
voting behavior: (i) pork, which consists of current payments that can be 
distributed to both PBs and opposition legislators, and (ii)  electoral 
benefits, which consist of promises of future partisan benefits that can only 
be distributed to PBs. On the other hand, the incumbent’s control of the 
leadership is always a potentially precarious construction: the leader needs 
to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading (Panebianco 
1988; Calvert 1987). 
    Since promises of future benefits can only be delivered if the incumbent 
leader retains the command of the party, a collective action problem 
between backbenchers opposing the incumbent emerges. Backbenchers risk 
losing much by opposing a leader who (they believe) has a firm support 
inside the party, but might be willing to do so if they believe that others 
will do so too. In other words, in this environment the value of the 
incumbent’s promises is not exogenously given, but endogenously 
determined by backbenchers’ aggregate support to the incumbent leader. 
                                                                                                                                     
power in the literature is only matched by that of the vote of confidence in parliamentary 
systems (see Diermeier and Feddersen 1998 for a formal statement of this argument).   3
    To consider this problem formally, we model the internal constraints 
faced by the incumbent party leader as the partisan equivalent of a 
confidence vote procedure. The party leader is overthrown - and her 
promises of electoral benefits abandoned in favor of a reward to the 
supporters of the new establishment - whenever her advocated position 
does not gather the support of a minimum proportion µ  (µ ≤ 12 / ) of 
party backbenchers in the legislature.
2 Since µ < 12 /  means that the 
removal of the leader requires the defection of more than a majority of 
PBs, we refer to this case as a supermajority requirement for removal. 
    We  analyze  the  equilibrium  outcomes in this environment under an 
assumption of incomplete information about PBs’ preferences. Although it 
is common knowledge that backbenchers want to vote for policies which 
are close to their constituency’s preferred position, these ideal policies are 
assumed to be the legislators’ private information, and correlated with 
each other. Specifically, the ideal policy of PB i is composed of a common 
and an idiosyncratic unobservable components. As a result, backbenchers 
are uncertain about the distribution of fellow party members in the policy 
space, but can use the information contained in their constituencies’ 
preferred position to enhance their estimate. 
    While under an assumption of common knowledge of PBs’ preferences 
radically different behavioral patterns can be sustained as equilibria by self 
                                                 
2 We rule out the caseµ > 12 / , as it would imply that a challenger gathering the support 
of a minority of the party would be able to overthrow the incumbent from office. 
   4
fulfilling beliefs, relaxing this assumption allows us to pin down a unique 
equilibrium, and thus leads to a much more productive analysis.
3 We 
show, in particular, that electoral benefits can be useless for the incumbent 
leader; i.e., contrary to the conventional wisdom, nomination power can be 
completely ineffective in providing discipline in legislative parties. 
    Specifically,  Proposition  1.2  shows that if a majority of the party 
disagrees (ex ante) with the incumbent’s preferred position, electoral 
benefits are useless to the incumbent leader unless she also distributes 
benefits on the spot, or she is protected by a supermajority requirement 
for removal. This illustrates the central insight of the paper. Promises of 
future benefits will alter voting behavior only if party members believe 
that the incumbent leader has a strong hold to the reins of power. 
Understanding the role of different instruments in achieving discipline thus 
requires understanding their contribution to the formation of these 
expectations among backbenchers. 
    In this track, we show that there is a complementarity between the 
allocation of pork to party members and the value of electoral benefits. 
Keeping PBs’ beliefs about the actions of fellow party members fixed, an 
increase of one dollar in the allocation of pork to party members increases 
the net value of the incumbent’s offer by the same amount. Beliefs about 
the actions of other PBs will not remain fixed, however, as the revised 
offer will induce PBs to anticipate a higher support to the party line 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the methodological aspects underpinning this result, see Morris and 
Shin 2001, Morris and Shin 2003, and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner 2003. 
   5
among party members, and thus a higher probability of the incumbent’s 
survival, leading ultimately to a higher expected value of her promises. 
    As  an  immediate  consequence  of this complementarity, we have the 
following result. If endowed with sufficiently large amount of current 
resources (pork), the incumbent can make the electoral benefits valuable, 
even when ex ante a majority of the party opposes the party line. 
Moreover, in this case the incumbent needs in fact to buy the party in 
order to generate discipline. In the absence of a supermajority requirement 
for removal of the leader, then, the influence of backbenchers is not lost, 
but only reshaped in terms of a lower bound of payments that needs to be 
allocated to party members for party resources to be in play. 
    This raises the question of how the allocation of pork between party 
and non-party members is affected by the availability of future partisan 
benefits. While pork can be used to attain the support of opposition 
legislators, this allocation has an opportunity cost: buying the opposition 
implies weakening the support inside the party. In fact, our previous 
analysis implies that the magnitude of this opportunity cost will be 
determined by the strength of the complementarity between pork and 
electoral benefits. Proposition 1.4 exploits the fact that the multiplier 
effect of current resources is higher the more exposed the incumbent is to 
internal threats, to conclude that more vulnerable leaders will allocate a 
higher proportion of pork to buy members of their own party vis a vis the 
opposition.   6
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is 
presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 provides a characterization of voting 
equilibria, which constitutes the basis of the substantive study in Section 
1.4. Section 1.5 extends the model to include an endogenous determination 
of the challenge to the incumbent leader. We show here that the basic 
model is a stylized description of this extended framework, assuming that 
policy alternatives are not ”too close” in the policy space. Section 1.6 
relates the framework and results with the literature, and Section 1.7 
concludes. 
 
1.2  The Basic Model 
    There are three types of agents in the model: (i) a party leader, (ii) a 
continuum of party backbenchers (PBs), with total size 1 and (iii) a 
continuum of size β < 1 of opposition legislators. PBs and opposition 
legislators integrate a legislature, which chooses between two given policy 
alternatives q and x, q x < , by simple majority voting. 
 
1.2.1  Legislators' Preferences and Information 
        PBs’ payoffs are determined by (i) ”monetary” benefits they can 
extract from the party leadership, and (ii) the distance between their 
constituents ”ideal policy”θi  and the policy they voted for in Congress,   7
xq x i ∈{,} .
4 In particular, monetary transfers enter linearly into their 
utility function, and policy preferences of PB i are represented by a utility 
function ux ii (| |) − θ . 
    It  will  be  convenient  to define - taking the pair (,) q x  of policy 
alternatives as given - the function vu q u x iii ( ) (| |) (| |) θ θ θ ≡ − − − . The value 
v i () θ  denotes the net gain of voting for q instead of x for PB i, with ideal 
policyθi . Note that by construction v i () θ = 0 at  θi xq = + (( ) / ) 2 , and 
that  |( ) | v ⋅  is symmetric around this point. Moreover, we will assume 
throughout that v() ⋅ is a continuous function satisfying the following 
condition: 
 
    Assumption (A1). There exists α > 0 such that ∀ (,' ) θ θ ii with θ θ ii '> ,  
vv ii i i () (' ) (' ) θ θ α θ θ − ≥ −  
 
    Assumption A1 implies, in particular, that v() ⋅ is strictly decreasing and 
that |( ) | v ⋅  is convex, making v() ⋅ unbounded above and below.
5 
    The ideal policy of each PB, θi , is private information, but correlated 
with that of the other PBs. Specifically, we assume that the ideal policy of 
                                                 
4 This formulation intends to capture the essential tradeoff for legislators between 
pleasing their constituencies and the party leadership, two ”masters” with (generically) 
different objectives. 
 
5 The assumed properties of v obviously translate into certain requirements that our 
primitive function u must satisfy. In particular, for v to be decreasing, it is necessary that 
u is a decreasing, concave function.   8
PB i is given by θ θ ε ii =+, where the common component θ  is drawn 
from a  N(, ) θη 0
2  distribution, the idiosyncratic component εi  is i.i.d., and 
drawn from a  N(, ) 0
2 σ distribution, and both θ  and εi  are unobservable.
6 
    Opposition legislators have policy preferences u() ⋅  identical to those of 
PBs. Although their ideal policies are private information, we assume that 
they are distributed according to a known c.d.f. G() ⋅ . This implies, in 
particular, that the proportion of opposition legislators with ideal policy 
below some number z is public information. 
 
1.2.2  Party Leadership and Payments 
    The party leader cares about the policy outcome: the leader obtains net 
benefit  w > 0 from the policy outcome being x instead of q. The leader is 
endowed with two types of resources with which to influence legislators’ 
voting behavior: (i) pork, which consists of current payments that can be 
distributed to both PBs (r) and opposition legislators (ro), and (ii) 
electoral benefits (e), which consist of promises of future partisan benefits 
that can only be distributed to PBs. As the notation suggests, we will 
restrict to payments that are symmetric among legislators of the same 
party. Moreover, we will only allow payments to an individual to be 
                                                 
6 Note then that a PB is uncertain about the distribution of his fellow party members in 
the policy space: a democrat from California observes the preferences of his constituency, 
but can not perfectly separate what part is due to them being Californian and what part 
is due to them being democrats. Note, however, that a PB will use his private 
information to estimate where other party legislators lie in the policy space.   9
conditional on his actions, thus precluding more complex mechanisms that 
could possibly depend on aggregate voting patterns. 
    Pork payments are conditional offers: a PB receives r when voting in 
favor of x, and zero otherwise. Similarly, an opposition legislator receives 
ro when voting in favor of x, and zero otherwise. The party leader chooses 
r and ro subject to the (ex ante) budget constraint rr R oβ + ≤ , where R 
denotes the total amount of pork resources available to the leader. 
Residuals from unaccepted offers are kept by the incumbent leader. 
    Unlike  pork  -  the  allocation  of which is final and irreversible - 
conditional promises of electoral benefits can only be delivered if the 
incumbent leader survives internal challenges to her authority. 
Specifically, we assume that the party leader can choose between two 
alternative procedures, which we call a partisan and a non-partisan vote. 
    In a non-partisan vote the incumbent commits to distribute e to every 
PB irrespective of his vote. Electoral benefits thus play no role in 
influencing the voting behavior of PBs. Moreover, in the basic model, we 
assume that this unconditional allocation of electoral benefits is never 
challenged. The net payoff of voting for x for PB i in a non-partisan vote 
is then given by Π np i i rv () () θ θ = − . 
    In a party vote, instead, the incumbent commits to distribute e only to 
PBs voting for x, and zero to others. We assume, however, that the 
conditional allocation of electoral benefits implicit in the party vote will   10
always trigger a challenge to the party leader.
7 A challenge consists of an 
alternative conditional distribution of electoral benefits: if a challenge is 
successful, PBs voting for q receive electoral benefits e, and those voting 
for x receive zero.
8 A challenge is successful if the incumbent’s advocated 
position does not gather sufficient support by PBs in the legislature; i.e., if 
the mass of PBs in the incumbent’s coalition, denoted by Γ , does not 
reach a minimum threshold µ  ( µ ≤ 12 / ). To summarize, the net 
monetary payoff for a PB voting for x is e if the incumbent survives the 
challenge (if Γ < µ), and -e if the incumbent is overthrown. The net 
expected payoff of voting for x for PB i in a party vote is then 
ΠΓ pi i i re v ( ) [ Pr( )| ] ( ) θ µ θ θ =+ − < − 12 . 
 
1.2.3  Strategies and Equilibrium 
        Taking advantage of our minimalist representation of opposition 
legislators, we will exclude them from the set of players, and instead 
consider their best responses as part of the environment. Specifically, since 
the pork resource constraint rr R oβ + ≤  will hold with equality at the 
                                                 
7 Section 5 extends the model allowing an endogenous determination of the challenge. 
There we show that the incumbent won’t be challenged (i) in a non-partisan vote or (ii) 
in a party vote if x is sufficiently close to q (x x < ~ for some ~ x ), but is challenged 
whenever x x > ~. The basic model is thus a reduced form of the complete model, assuming 
that policy alternatives are not ”too similar”. 
 
8 As with pork, due to unaccepted offers in a party vote there won’t be ex post budget 
balance of electoral benefits. The remainder can be assumed to be distributed to party 
members who are not currently in Congress, kept in the party safe box, or burned. 
   11
optimum, we substitute rR r o = − () / β , and treat the main party leader’s 
allocation decision simply as a choice of a pork offer to party members 
r R ∈[, ] 0 . Given any such offer r, the mass of legislators in the opposition 
voting for x is then given by  ( ) [( () / ) ] 1
1 −−
− Gv R r ββ . The players in the 
modified game are therefore PBs and the incumbent party leader. 
        The timeline consists of three stages. In Stage 1, nature chooses a 
realization of the unobservable random variables θ  and εi , and each PB i 
privately observes his ideal policy θ θ ε ii = + . The party leader receives no 
such private signal. In Stage 2, the party leader decides (i) whether to 
make the vote a non-partisan vote or a party vote, and (ii) an allocation of 
pork to PBs. In Stage 3, legislators vote between the alternatives x and q. 
    A strategy for the incumbent leader is therefore a choice of a couple 
(, ) ar I , where ap n p I ∈{, }  and r R ∈[, ] 0 . The incumbent’s choice of aI  
induces, respectively, a non-partisan-voting game and a party-voting game 
among PBs. A strategy for a PB i can therefore be described by a pair of 
functions  ξi
np
i r (;) ⋅  and ξi
p r (; ) ⋅  mapping the set of types Θ and possible 
pork allocations to party members [0,R] to {,} q x . The resulting ξθ i
np
i r (; )  
and ξθ i
p
i r (; )  are therefore the votes of a PB i with ideal policy θi  in the 
non-partisan-voting and party-voting games, given an offer of pork r to 
party members.   12




ii ξθ ξ θ  such 
that (i)  (, ) ar I  is feasible and sequentially rational and that (ii)  ξθ i
np
i r (; )  
and  ξθ i
p
i r (; )  constitute, respectively, a BNE of the non-partisan-voting 
and party-voting games. 
 
1.3  The Fundamentals: Voting 
    This section considers voting equilibria, and is thus the basis of the 
substantive study in section 1.4. After characterizing equilibria in non-
partisan voting (Remark 1.1), we turn to the core of the section: the 
analysis of party votes. We show that if the distribution of PBs’ 
preferences is common knowledge, radically different behavioral patterns 
can be sustained as equilibria of party votes by self-fulfilling beliefs 
(Remark 1.2). Relaxing this assumption allows us to pin down a unique 
equilibrium, which we characterize in Proposition 1.1. 
    Consider first non-partisan voting. Note that the net payoff of voting 
for  x for a PB i is here given by Π np i i rv () () θ θ = − , and is therefore 
independent of the actions of other players (this is a decision problem). 
Letting δnp rv r () () ≡
−1 , we then have:    
   13
Remark 1.1 (Non-Partisan Voting).  In a non-partisan voting equilibrium, 
ξθ i
np
i rx (; ) =  for all i such that θ δ in p r > ()  and ξθ i
np
i rq (; ) =  for all i such that 
θ δ in p r < () . 
 
    The situation is qualitatively different in a party vote. In a party vote, 
only PBs with ”extreme” policy preferences are impervious to the actions 
of fellow party members. The decision of ”centrist” individuals, instead, is 
determined by their beliefs about what others will do. For these 
individuals, supporting the incumbent’s party line is optimal only if doing 
so allows them to capture a sufficiently high level of expected party 
payments. The net expected value of the incumbent’s offer for individual i 
depends, in turn, on whether the incumbent leader will be able to retain 
the command of the party, and thus on i’s beliefs about the proportion of 
PBs supporting the incumbent’s party line. If i believes that more than µ  
PBs will stick with the incumbent leader, he will want to do so as well; if 
he believes that at least 1− µ PBs will defect, he will ”defect” too. 
        In particular, if the distribution of party members’ preferences is 
common knowledge, and the proportion of ”extremists” is not high enough 
to determine the outcome of the incumbent’s survival from the outset,   14




Remark 1.2. Let  θi vre ≡+
−1()  and θi vre ≡−
−1() . Suppose that θ  is 
common knowledge, and that θθ σ µθ ii <+ − <
− Φ
1 1 (). Then the following 
strategy profiles are BNE of the party voting game: 
(1) ξθ i
p
i rx (; ) =  ∀> i ii :θ θ  and ξθ i
p
i rq (; ) =  ∀ < i ii :θ θ  and 
(2) ξθ i
p
i rx (; ) =  ∀> i ii :θθ  and ξθ i
p
i rq (; ) =  ∀< i ii :θθ  
 
    Proof. Consider first strategy profile (1). Since θθ θσ i N |~ ( , )
2 , the 
proportion of PBs voting for x is then given by 
( ) ( ) σ
θ θ −
Φ −
i 1 , where  () Φ⋅ is 
the c.d.f. of the standard normal. The incumbent survives the challenge 
(with certainty) if 
() 11
1 −− > ⇔ > − −
− ΦΦ () ( ) θθ σ µ θθσ µ ii  
Since this is true by hypothesis, the expected net payoff of voting for q for 
PB  i is given by vr e i () θ − − .  Then optimality implies ξθ i
p
i rq (; ) =  if 
θθ ii vre <+ ≡
−1() and ξθ i
p
i rx (; ) =  if θ θ ii > . Similarly, consider strategy 
profile (2). The proportion of PBs voting for x is then given by 
                                                 
9 When θσ µ θ +− <
− Φ
1 1 () i , strategy profile (1) in the remark constitutes the unique BNE 
of the party vote game. Similarly, when θσ µ θ +− <
− Φ
1 1 () i , strategy profile (2) is the 
unique BNE.   15
() 1−− Φ () θθ σ i . The incumbent leader will fall for sure if 
() 11
1 −−< ⇔ < − −
− ΦΦ () ( ) θθ σ µ θθσ µ ii , which again is true by 
hypothesis. The expected net payoff of voting for x for PB i is then given 
by  rev i −−() θ , and optimality implies ξθ i
p
i rx (; ) =  if θθ ii > and  
ξθ i
p
i rq (; ) =  if θθ ii < . 
Q.E.D.  
 
1.3.1  Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Party Votes 
    The assumption that the distribution of party members’ preferences is 
common knowledge among PBs, however, is not desirable per se. 
Moreover, as recent developments in the global games literature show, 
relaxing this assumption allows us to pin down a unique equilibrium (see 
Morris and Shin 1998, 2001, 2003, and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner 2003). 
The basic results are summarized in Proposition 1.1: when PBs are 
uncertain about the central tendency of the party (i) there exists a 
symmetric equilibrium in which PBs employ switching strategies with a 
cutpoint  δθ θ pi i ∈ (,) . Moreover, (ii) this equilibrium is unique provided 
that the uncertainty about the central tendency of the party (as 
parameterized by η) is high enough. The cutpoint δp, which completely 
characterizes this equilibrium, is pinned down by the net expected value   16
attached by the critical player with ideal policy δp to the promises of 
electoral benefits made by the incumbent leader. 
    Consider a symmetric strategy profile in which PBs employ switching 
strategies with an arbitrary cutpoint δ . Denote by Π(;) θ δ i   the net 
expected benefit of supporting x for a PB with ideal policy θi  given this 
strategy profile. Similarly, denote by Γ(;) θ δ  the proportion of PBs voting 
for x according to this strategy profile given a particular realization of θ . 
Since  θθ θσ i N |~ ( , )
2 , then  ( ) ΓΦ (;) ( ) θδ δ θ σ =− − 1 , where  () Φ⋅ is the 
c.d.f. of the standard normal. Hence  () ΓΦ (;) θδ µ θ δ σ µ <⇔<− −
−1 1 , so 
that 
( ) ΠΦ (;) [ P r ( |) ] () θδ θ δ σ µθ θ ii i re v =+ <− − −
−1 1  
    By  Bayes’  Law,  θθ θθ η |~( $() , ) ii N

















22 . We then define the function 






























   (1.1)   
    Intuitively,  P i (; ) δ θ  is the net expected value of a dollar of electoral 
benefits made conditional on supporting the incumbent leader’s party line 
for an individual with ideal policy θi , when every PB uses a switching 
strategy with cutoff point δ . Then:  
Π(;) (,) () θ δ δ θ θ ii i re P v = + −    17
    Denoting  by  pP () (,) δ δ δ ≡  the net expected value of a dollar of 
electoral benefits for the critical PB with ideal policy δ , and letting 
π δ δ δ () (;) ≡Π , we have 
π δ δ δ () () () = + − re p v  
    Lemma 1.3 in the appendix shows that (i)  p() ⋅  is a decreasing function, 
and that (ii) |' ( ) | p ⋅  is bounded above by a decreasing function of η which 
goes to zero as η →∞.
10 Since by A1 the slope of v() ⋅  is bounded away 
from zero, this implies that for sufficiently high η,  π() ⋅  is an increasing 
function and π δ () = 0 at exactly one point. 
    Proposition 1.1 is then a rather straightforward application of similar 
results in the global games literature (see Morris and Shin 1998, 2001 and 
2003, and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner 2003): 
 
Proposition 1.1.  Let  δ δ π δ p ∈ = ≠ ∅ {: () } 0 . There exists a symmetric 
equilibrium of the party vote game in which ξθ i
p
i rx (; ) =  for all i such that 
                                                 
10 To grasp the intuition for this result, note that this is equivalent to saying that a more 
”right-winged” critical PB assigns a higher probability to the incumbent being 
overthrown. Note, then, that increasing δ   (i) increases the cutoff point determining 
whether other PBs will support or challenge the incumbent (vote for x or q), and (ii) 
changes the beliefs of the critical PB concerning the central tendency of the party. Since 
the c.d.f. of θ  conditional on θi  is stochastically increasing in θi , a more right-winged 
critical PB will consider less likely that the incumbent will be overthrown. This effect, 
however, is dampened by the prior beliefs. As a result, the increase in the cutoff 
dominates, producing the result. The second result follows from the same logic, since 
increasing  η  diffuses the prior, and thus diminishes the ”dampening” of the change in 
beliefs. 
   18
θ δ ip >  and ξθ i
p
i rq (; ) =  for all i such that θ δ ip < . Moreover, there exists a η  
such that whenever η η > ,  {: () } δ π δ = 0   has a single element δp, and this 
equilibrium is unique. 
     Proof. See Appendix 1.A.  
 
 





















   
 
1.4  Party Discipline and Vote Buying 
    In this section, we turn to the substantive analysis leading to the main 
conclusions of the paper. In doing so, we assume throughout that the 
condition in Proposition 1.1 is met. We start by making precise the   19
definition of party discipline that we will employ in the remainder of the 
paper. 
 
1.4.1  Party Discipline: A Definition 
    The informal definition of party discipline advanced in the introduction 
referred to the ability of party leaders to influence the voting behavior of 
PBs with party resources (resources that can only be distributed among 
party members; i.e., electoral benefits). This brief section has the double 
purpose of providing a rationale for this definition, and of making it more 
precise. The definition we will employ is as follows: 
 
Definition 1.1. Define party discipline, dR :[ , ] 0 → ℜ , by 




i () i n f {: ( ;) } i n f { : ( ;) } ≡= − = θξ θ θξ θ  
     
        That is, given an allocation r of pork to party members, we define 
party discipline as the difference between the ideal policy of the most left-
winged PB supporting the incumbent’s party line in a non-partisan vote, 
and that of the most left-winged PB supporting the party line in a party 
vote. By Remark 1.1 and Proposition 1.1, then, it follows that: 
 
Remark 1.3. (i) dr np p () =− δ δ , and (ii) dr p p () ( ) > ⇔ > 00 δ  
   20
    Point (ii) above simply notes that discipline is positive if and only if the 
critical PB δp assigns positive (net) value to the promises of electoral 
benefits of the incumbent leader.  
        This definition satisfies several appealing properties. First, a useful 
definition of party discipline must distinguish between the non-partisan 
and the partisan frameworks. Specifically, party discipline should not 
reflect unity in voting that is driven by the absence of conflict between 
PBs over their preferred alternative. Instead, party discipline must 
indicate the ability of the party, and in particular of the party leadership, 
to mold PBs’ behavior. This is in the spirit of Krehbiel 1993, Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, and Tsebelis 1995, and is now standard in the recent 
literature.
11 The comparison of the partisan and non-partisan thresholds 
δp and δnp accomplishes this demand without being (directly) influenced 
by the distribution of preferences within the party (e.g., heterogeneity of 
PBs’ preferences,σ ). The notion we introduce differs from what is the 
norm in the literature in the choice of the non-partisan framework to 
employ. In particular, this definition does not include changes in party 
members’ voting behavior that are achieved with resources that could 
                                                 
11 Krehbiel 1993 makes the point sharply: “[D]o legislators vote with fellow party members 
in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question, or ... because of their 
agreement about the policy in question?” In the same vein, Cox and McCubbins 1993 
argue that “[I]nvestigations of parties as floor voting coalitions ought to be conducted in 
terms of loyalty to party leaders and not, as has usually been done in the previous 
literature, in terms of general party cohesion”. Similarly, Tsebelis 1995 differentiates 
discipline – “the ability of parties to eliminate dissent after a decision is made” - from 
cohesion - “the size of differences [in policy preferences] before the discussion” (italics in 
original). 
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have otherwise been destined to non-party members (i.e., pork). This view 
emphasizes that allocating pork to party members means having to buy 
their support, and is therefore not an indication of power within the 
organization. 
 
1.4.2  Conditional Party Governance 
    We consider first the situation in which the incumbent leader is not 
protected by supermajority requirements for removal (µ = 12 / ), and no 
pork is allocated to party members (r = 0). We show that in this setting, 
credible promises of electoral benefits confer only limited strength to the 
party leader, and a result similar to Aldrich and Rohde’s conditional party 
governance emerges: the incumbent leader will use electoral benefits to 
support the party line only if the leadership’s incentives are aligned (ex 
ante) with those of the majority of the party. Recall that θ0 denotes the 
ideal policy of the ex ante party median. Then: 
 
Proposition 1.2. Let  R = 0 and µ = 12 /  be given. Then (i) party votes occur in 
equilibrium if and only if v() θ0 0 <  (i.e., θ0 prefers x to q), and (ii) in party votes, 
the ex ante median is in the incumbent's coalition: δ θ p ≤ 0.  
 
    Proof. First note that the incumbent will call a party vote in 
equilibrium if and only if discipline is positive. Now,   22
dr p np p p () ( ) =− ≥ ⇔ ≥ δ δ δ 00 . That is, discipline is positive if and only if 
the critical PB δp assigns net positive value to the incumbent’s promises 
of electoral benefits. But with µ = 12 / ,  p pp () δ δ θ ≥ ⇔ ≤ 0 0, because 
P r ( ( ; ) |) ) P r ( |) ) / Γ θ δ µθ δ θ δ θ δ δ θ pi p p i p p <== < = < ⇔ < 12 0 
    That is, with  µ = 12 / , the critical PB δp assigns net positive value to 
the incumbent’s promises of electoral benefits if and only if the ex ante 
party median is in the incumbent’s coalition (iff δ θ p < 0). Hence 
d p ≥⇔ ≤ 0 0 δ θ . Now, with r = 0, δnp v =
−1 0 () , and then v np () δ = 0. Since 
ep() δ  is continuously decreasing, but everywhere flatter than v() δ , then 
δ θ δ δ np p np d ≤⇔ ≤ ⇔ ≥ 0 0. Finally, θ0 prefers x to q iff δθ np v =≤
−1
0 0 () , 
implying that θ0 prefers x to q iff d ≥ 0.  
Q.E.D. 
 
        Note that this result holds independently of the level of electoral 
benefits available to the incumbent leader. Thus, Proposition 1.2 shows in 
a crude way that even if credible per se, and significant in amount, 
promises of electoral benefits do not necessarily have influence over policy 
outcomes. This is specially so under the conditions assumed in the 
proposition. In this case, the incumbent will choose to allocate electoral 
benefits to PBs conditionally on their support of the incumbent’s party   23
line only when the leadership’s policy preferences are aligned (ex ante) 
with those of the majority of the party. 
    Furthermore, the power that electoral benefits confer to the leadership 
in this environment can be attributed entirely to the heterogeneity of 
policy preferences among party backbenchers. 
 
Proposition 1.3. Let  R = 0 and µ = 12 /  be given. In equilibrium, discipline in 
party votes decreases with the homogeneity of PBs' preferences, and Limd
σ → =
0 0  
 
    While the proof of this result is deferred until Proposition 1.6 - which 
contains it as a special case – we provide here the basic logic behind this 
result.
12 Recall that PBs use both (i) public information about the central 
tendency of the party and (ii) the information contained in their own 
preferences to form beliefs about the distribution of fellow party members’ 
preferences (and thus ultimately about their actions). The need to 
anticipate the reaction of other party legislators is due to the basic 
coordination problem arising between legislators willing to oppose the 
incumbent’s mandate. 
    Central for any PB in this problem is comparing his preferences with 
those of other party members. When party members’ preferences are 
heterogeneous, only the ex ante median believes he is ”centrist”, attaching 
                                                 
12 A full discussion of the result is included as Appendix 1.B, which complements the 
more efficient but less revealing formal proof in Proposition 1.6.   24
equal probability to any member having ideal policy higher or lower than 
his own. PBs with ideal policy θ θ i < 0, instead, believe that a majority of 
the party is to the left of the ex ante median. The informational content of 
a PB’s ideal policy, in turn, increases with the homogeneity of the party. 
This implies, in particular, that PBs with ideal policy θ θ i < 0 will attach a 
higher probability to the incumbent being overthrown (and thus a lower 
value to her promises of electoral benefits) the more homogeneous the 
party is. 
    Note, however, that we are not concerned with how any arbitrary PB 
forms its beliefs, but with how the critical PB δp does. But we know from 
Proposition 1.2 that when the incumbent can be overthrown by a simple 
majority of rebelling PBs, the critical PB δp assigns positive value to the 
incumbent’s promises of electoral benefits only if the ex ante median is in 
the incumbent’s coalition; i.e., only if δ θ p < 0. The argument in the 
previous paragraph then implies that if discipline is positive, it must 
decrease with an increase in the homogeneity of PBs’ preferences.  
    Opposite to the case of heterogeneous preferences, where as we noted 
only the ex ante median believes he is ”centrist”, in the limit as σ  goes to 
zero every individual believes he is ”centrist” (as no weight is given to the 
ex ante median). But then for the critical PB, whose ideal policy coincides 
with the symmetric strategy’s cutoff point, electoral benefits offered by the 
incumbent must have no value. This means that electoral benefits will   25
have no bite in equilibrium, and therefore discipline must vanish in 
equilibrium as σ  goes to zero. 
 
1.4.3  Vote Buying 
    The analysis so far assumed that the incumbent could be overthrown 
by a simple majority of PBs, and that the incumbent could not use 
resources other than the partisan electoral benefits to sway legislators’ 
behavior. In this section, we relax these assumptions. We show that while 
both innovations have the unambiguous effect of increasing the leader’s 
power, they also have substantively different repercussions with respect to 
party backbenchers, the relation of the leader with the party, and the 
formation of legislative coalitions. 
    Being endowed with pork, the incumbent can now buy the support of 
legislators in the opposition. This, however, has an opportunity cost, as 
buying the opposition means weakening the support inside the party. The 
key to the results in this section is that this cost is magnified in a party 
vote as a result of a complementarity between the allocation of pork to 
party members and the value of electoral benefits. In a non-partisan vote - 
where PBs’ beliefs about the actions of fellow party members are 
irrelevant - decreasing the allocation of pork to the party by one dollar 
leads to an equivalent reduction in the value of the incumbent’s offer. In a 
party vote, instead, the value of the incumbent’s promises of electoral 
benefits is tied to the fate of the leader. But the reduction in the allocation 
of pork to party members will lead PBs to anticipate a lower aggregate   26
support for the party line and, as a result, a higher probability of the 
incumbent being overthrown. This reduction in the allocation of pork to 
party members will thus lead to a depreciation of the value of the 
incumbent’s promises of electoral benefits, and hence to a more than 
proportional effect over the net value of the incumbent’s offer. 
        The first implication of this logic is in the impact of endowing the 
leader with pork resources upon what we have dubbed conditional party 
governance. In the context of the previous section we showed (Proposition 
1.2) that party benefits were used to favor the party line only when - 
according to public information - the majority of the party preferred the 
party line to the legislative alternative. When the incumbent can influence 
legislators’ decisions with pork, however, party votes can exist in 
equilibrium even if θ0 prefers q to x. Nevertheless, in the absence of a 
supermajority requirement for removal of the leader, the influence of 
backbenchers is not lost, but only reshaped in terms of a lower bound of 
payments that needs to be allocated to party members for party resources 
to be in play. In particular, the allocation of pork to party members has to 
be at least as large as to attain the support of the (ex ante) party median. 
The simple result follows, in effect, from the proof of Proposition 1.2, and 
is stated in the following remark. 
 
Remark 1.4. Let µ = 12 / . If there is a party vote in equilibrium, rv ≥− () θ0   
   27
    Raising the bar for removal of the incumbent leader, instead, directly 
reduces the influence (and well-being) of backbenchers. Party discipline 
increases with the protection to the incumbent 1− µ, and therefore 
internal dissent is reduced even in the absence of compensations. Indeed, 
for every µ ∈ (, ] 012 there is a rmin() µ  such that rr p() () min µ µ ≥  for a party 
vote to be possible in equilibrium. Moreover, it can be easily verified that 
rmin() µ  is an increasing function, with maximum at rv min() ( ) 12 0 = − θ . 
    Furthermore, the next proposition shows that when party votes occur 
in equilibrium, the incumbent will allocate less pork to buy opposition 
legislators the more contestable the leadership position is. In essence, the 
result is due to the fact that increasing the contestability of the leadership 
boosts the complementarity between pork and the value of electoral 
benefits. In this situation, ”weak” leaders find more profitable buying their 
own party, thus avoiding large depreciations of the value of the electoral 
benefits at their disposal. 
 
Proposition 1.4.  Suppose that the incumbent would make a party vote with 
µµ =
0and thatµµ
10 < . Then rr pp () () µµ
01 ≥ ,  and the inequality is strict if 
rr R p()( () , ) min µµ
11 ∈   
 
    Proof. The first step is to characterize optimal allocations of pork to 
party members under rule µ ,  rp() µ . Let  )] ( ( 1 [ ) (
1 ⋅ − ≡ ⋅
− v G H . The mass of   28
legislators in the opposition voting for x given pork offer  o r  is given by 
β ) ( o r H . Note that  0 ) ( ' ≥ o r H  for all  o r . Pork resource constraint is given 
by rr R oβ +≤. Since this will hold with equality in the optimum, we write 
rR r o =− () / β . Conditional on θ  then, y=x iff 
2 ) 1 ( )) , ( , ( ) ( β µ δ θ β β + ≥ Γ + − r r R H p  
 Since  ) / ) ) , ( (( 1 )) , ( , ( σ θ µ δ µ δ θ − Φ − = Γ r r p p , this is 
) ( ) , ( r J r p − ≥ µ δ θ  
, where  ) ) / ) (( 2 / ) 1 (( ) (
1 β β β σ r R H r J − + − Φ ≡







− − Φ − = = ) ( ) ) , ( (
ˆ
1
1 ) Pr( 0 r J r x y p θ µ δ
η
 
An optimal allocation of pork for the incumbent  ) (µ p r maximizes 
) Pr( x y = . The FOC is: 
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The second and final step is to show that for all r 
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Then (1.4) together with (1.2) will implies that rr pp () () µµ
01 ≥ . Moreover, 
if  ) ), ( ( ) ( min
1 R r rp µ µ ∈ , so that  )) ( ( ' ) ), ( (
1 1 1 µ µ µ δ p p p r J r r = ∂ ∂ , then 
)) ( ( ' ) ), ( (
1 0 1 µ µ µ δ p p p r J r r = ∂ ∂ , and hence  ) ( ) (
1 0 µ µ p p r r > . 
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so that (1.3) can be written as: 
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1 0 1 1 0 0 r v r v r p r p
e
p p p p     (1.5) 
Note, next, that since in a party vote δ µ p r (, )  is increasing in µ , then 
δµδµ pp rr (, ) (, )
10 < . Assumption (A1) then implies that 
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p , so that 
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1 0 0 0 r p r p p p                (1.7) 








µ δ p , so that δµδµ pp rr (, ) (, )
01 >  implies that   30









∂ ) ); , ( ( ) ); , ( (
1 1 1 0 r p r p p p                   (1.8) 
Then (1.7) and (1.8) imply that 









∂ ) ); , ( ( ) ); , ( (
1 1 0 0 r p r p p p                   (1.9) 
Then (1.6) and (1.9) imply that (1.6) holds. 
Q.E.D. 
 
1.4.4  Cohesion and Discipline Revisited 
    In the context of Section 1.4.2 we showed that in equilibrium, discipline 
in party votes decreases with the homogeneity of PBs’ preferences. 
Proposition 1.6 revisits this result, allowing for arbitrary majority 
requirements for removal and allocations of pork to party members. The 
proposition shows that provided µ = 12 / , the result does generalize to 
arbitrary  r R ≤  as stated. When µ < 12 / , instead, the main intuition 
described above breaks down, and this is no longer the case. The gist of 
the argument is that with µ < 12 / , it is possible for the ex ante party 
median to be in the rebelling coalition, while still having positive 
discipline. When this is the case, the same argument used in Proposition 
1.3 shows that an increase in the heterogeneity of preferences will now 
diminish discipline.
13  Note, however, that this happens for relatively low 
                                                 
13 In addition to the discussion in Appendix B, the case of  2 / 1 < µ  adds an additional 
element to the analysis. This, however, reinforces the positive effect of heterogeneity on 
party discipline. For any given cutoff δ , the minimum value of θ  for which the   31
levels of discipline, where (ex ante) a majority of the party opposes the 
party leader’s mandate. 
 
Proposition 1.5. Let  µ = 12 /  and  ] , 0 [ R r∈  be given. In equilibrium, discipline 
in party votes decreases with the homogeneity of PBs' preferences, and Limd
σ → =
0 0. 
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, so that  0 ) ; ( ≥ ∂ ∂ σ σ δ p  if and only if: 











0 1 ) 1 (
η
σ
µ σ δ θ p                 (1.10) 
                                                                                                                                     
incumbent would not be overthrown,  ) 1 (
1 µ σ δ − Φ −
− , is decreasing in the majority 
required to successfully overthrow the incumbent  µ − 1 . This effect, furthermore, is 
proportional to the heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences; i.e., the more heterogeneous the 
party is, the more extreme θ  has to be in order for a supermajority of the party to join 
in the challenge to the incumbent leader. (while an increase in σ increases the probability 
of extreme events - see appendix 1.B - this is outweighed by the direct effect of the 
change in the critical central tendency of the party described above).   32
    But  if  ) ; ( σ δ p  increases with σ  at  ) ' (σ δ p , then 
) ' ( ) ' ' ( ' ' ' σ δ σ δ σ σ p p < ⇒ > . Hence more heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences 
must in this case increase discipline. Similarly, if  ) ; ( σ δ p decreases with σ  
at  ) ' (σ δ p , then more heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences must in this case 















⇔ ≥ ⇔ ≥
− Φ − =
− µ σ δ θ η




p p d  
    That is,  0 ≥ d if and only if 











0 1 ) 1 (
σ
η
µ σ δ θ p      (1.11) 
        Hence, in equilibrium, discipline in party votes necessarily increases 
with σ  if (1.10) is satisfied whenever (1.11) is. Since  p δ  is a continuously 
decreasing function of  0 θ , bounded below by  ) (
1 e r v i + ≡
− θ  and above by 
) (
1 e r v i − ≡
− θ , there is a unique 
*
0 θ  solving (1.10) with equality, and a 
unique 
* *
0 θ  solving (1.11) with equality. If  2 / 1 = µ , these two inequalities 
collapse to  p δ θ ≥ 0 . Therefore in equilibrium, discipline in party votes 
necessarily increases with σ . Moreover,  ) ( 0 ) (
1
0 0 r v p p p
− = ⇔ = ⇔ = θ δ θ δ , 





− = =θ θ . With  2 / 1 < µ , however, (1.10) is satisfied 
whenever (1.11) is only if  η σ ≥ .   33
    The results for the limit as  0 → σ  follow from Lemma 1.4 in the 
appendix, which shows that 
]) 2 1 [ ( ) (
1 1
0 µ
σ − + − =
− −
→ e r v r v d Lim  
Q.E.D. 
 
1.5  Extension: Endogenous Challenge 
    In the setting of the basic model, we assumed that challenges to the 
incumbent party leader occurred if and only if she made the vote a party 
vote. In this section we endogeneize the challenge. Given the lesser role of 
pork in this stage, we take an allocation r as given, and focus instead on 
the characteristics of the policy alternative being supported by the 
incumbent leader.
14 We show that under the assumptions in this section, 
(i) the incumbent is only challenged in party votes. Moreover, we 
distinguish two sets of alternatives x possibly being supported by the 
incumbent leader in party votes: a set of ”moderate” policies 
} ~ : { x x q x ≤ ≤ and a set of ”radical” policies  } ~ : { x x x ≥ . We show that (ii) 
the incumbent is not challenged in party votes for moderate policies, but 
always challenged in party votes for radical policies. The basic model is 
thus a stylized description of this extended framework.  
                                                 
14 In our formulation, pork allocations are unalterable, and therefore are not the prime 
determinants of challenges to the incumbent leader. The central elements, instead, are 
given by the policy alternatives being considered and the allocation of electoral benefits. 
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    After reviewing the amendments we impose to the model, we provide a 
formal statement of these results, and note its implications for the 
uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. 
 
1.5.1  The Extended Model 
        We consider the following ”challenge technology”. After the 
incumbent’s choice, PBs in a given set of potential challengers Ω 
simultaneously decide whether they will propose or not a challenge to the 
incumbent leader. We assume that the preferences of potential challengers 
are common knowledge, that  } : { Ω ∈ i i θ  is compact, and let 
} : min{ Ω ∈ ≡ i i θ ω . A challenge occurs if some potential challenger  Ω ∈ i  
proposes a challenge. Denoting the challenge decision of individual  Ω ∈ i  
by  } 1 , 0 { ) ; ( ∈ x c i i θ , and by  } 1 , 0 { ) ( ∈ x c  the occurrence of a challenge, then 
1 ) ( = x c  whenever  1 ) ; ( = x c i i θ  for some  Ω ∈ i and  0 ) ( = x c  otherwise. 
Proposing the challenge is costless, and provides no special benefits (in the 
event the challenge is successful) vis a vis the remaining PBs opposing the 
incumbent leader. 
    We modify the definition of equilibrium to exclude equilibria containing 
weakly dominated strategies. We also impose the following additional 
assumption about PBs’ preferences (replacing A1):
15 
                                                 
15 Again, this is satisfied by a quadratic utility function  2 ) ( ) ; ( i i i i x b x u θ θ − − = . Here 
b 2 = =α α .   35
     Assumption (A1’). For every x, there exist  0 > ≥α α  such that for all 
) ' , ( i i θ θ  with  i i θ θ > ' , 
) ' )( ( ) ; ' ( ) ; ( ) ' )( ( i i i i i i q x x v x v q x θ θ α θ θ θ θ α > − ≥ − ≥ > −  
    For given q and x, (A1’) bounds the change in  ) ( i v θ  above and below. 
It also requires the bounds  ) ' ( i i θ θ α >  and  ) ( q x − α  to hold for any  q x >  
once corrected by the distance  q x− . 
 
1.5.2  Main Result, and Implications for Uniqueness of 
Equilibrium Outcomes 
    Proposition 1.1 showed that given any pair of policy alternatives  ) , ( x q , 
the party vote game has a unique equilibrium provided there is sufficient 
uncertainty about the central tendency of the party. Specifically, keeping q 
fixed, we have shown that for any x there is a  ) (x η  such that a party vote 
equilibrium is unique whenever  ) (x η η > . Under reasonable assumptions 
about preferences, however,  ) (x η  decreases with  | | q x − , and   
∞ =
→ ) (x Lim
q x η . Thus for fixed η , there is an x sufficiently close to q such 
that  ) (x η η < , and the sufficient condition for uniqueness is not met. 
    Note, however, that while the absence of policy-driven conflict allows 
for multiple resolutions of a challenge should one occur, it also diminishes   36
the benefit of mounting the challenge in the first place. Proposition 1.6 
shows that if PBs are sufficiently uncertain about the distribution of fellow 
party members preferences, and challengers do not use weakly dominated 
strategies, challenges occur in equilibrium only for ”radical” alternatives, 
and these always have a unique resolution. 
 
Proposition 1.6. There exists a η  such that for all x>q, whenever 
) ( 1 ) ( : x x c η η η η > ⇒ = > . Moreover, for each  η η >  there exists a  ℜ ∈ η x ~  such 
that  η x x x c ~ 1 ) ( ≥ ⇔ =  
 
    Proof. The result is implied by Remark 1.6, Lemma 1.5 and Lemma 1.6 
in Appendix 1.A. 
Q.E.D. 
 
1.6  Relation with the Literature 
    Students of political parties unanimously agree in that parties are not 
”horizontal” organizations, but rather are characterized by having a 
hierarchical structure, in which leadership posts can be clearly 
distinguished from the rank and file.
16  The creation of a leader - which is 
                                                 
16 “We must nonetheless take account of the established fact (established by a lot of 
empirical research of parties) that the principal power resources tend to be concentrated 
in the hands of small groups. Michels’ oligarchy, Duverger’s ’inner circle’, Ostrogorski and 
Weber’s ’ceasaristic-plebiscitarian dictatorship’ are just a few examples which bring this 
phenomenon to mind.” (Panebianco 1988). 
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also a characteristic of congressional parties - has been rationalized as an 
optimal institutional response, (implicitly) agreed upon by party members 
in a ”constitutional stage”, and designed to further the welfare of the 
collective. For Kiewit and McCubbins 1991, for example: 
 
”[I]t is the delegation of authority to a central agent to lead 
or manage the organization that is the key to overcoming 
problems of collective action .... In the case of congressional 
parties, leaders can exploit the prominence of their position 
to identify a focal point, thus solving problems of 
coordination by rallying support around one of possibly 
many acceptable alternatives.” 
 
    With the possible exception of small or regionally concentrated parties, 
however, legislative parties bundle together individuals with significantly 
heterogeneous policy preferences. Structuring collective action in parties 
thus also involves resolving, to one way or the other, diverging views 
among party members. As a result of this, the definition of who occupies 
the leadership, and what the ”party line” is, expresses the resolution of 
power struggles inside the party:  
 
”Power equilibria within the coalition can be altered at any 
moment .... A dominant coalition is therefore always a 
potentially precarious construction. It disintegrates due to 
the pressure of [minority elites] ... because of internal 
conflicts due to changes in its internal distribution of power.” 
(Panebianco 1988) 
 
    , or: 
“The key determinant of the desirability of checks within the 
structure of party leadership is the degree of homogeneity in   38
the policy preferences of the membership ... when the party 
caucus is riven by serious policy disputes, there is more 
support for checks. Without them, one faction, upon gaining 
control of the machinery of leadership, might pursue policies 
that are anathema to another faction, thereby weakening or 
even splintering the party.” (Kiewit and McCubbins 1991) 
 
    A similar view in fact emerges in the works of Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 
Cox and McCubbins 1993, and Calvert 1987.
17,18  Understanding the 
determinants of the power of legislative leaders over their ”followers” is 
thus crucial to determine how preferences of party members are 
aggregated to produce partisan outcomes. In this area there is, however, 
much less theoretical agreement. 
    At one extreme, exemplified by Michels’ iron law of oligarchy (Michels 
1958), party leaders “are not checked by those who hold subsidiary 
positions within the organization” (Casinelli 1953). In this view, parties 
“never operate ’democratically’ - i.e., rule by the rank-and-file rather than 
by the leaders.” (Schonfeld 1981), and “the rank and file are manipulated 
into accepting policies with which they would not otherwise agree, and 
which are not in their interests, or at least are primarily in the interests of 
                                                 
17 In the case of Calvert, the same notion appears with a different emphasis: ”In general 
the leader’s goals do not correspond exactly with an abstract notion of political welfare 
for the group, and in any event the leader’s goals will probably differ from those of any 
individual follower. Thus a rational, utility-maximizing leader will pursue collective 
action for the group in such a way that his own goals are achieved.” (Calvert 1987) 
 
18 It should be noted, however, that in both Aldrich and Rodhe’s and Cox and 
McCubbins’s view, the rank and file will not delegate the powers to the leadership unless 
their views are sufficiently homogeneous. When they are, instead, this delegation will 
occur, and the structure of the leader’s incentives will make her “internalize the goals of 
the members, and therefore behave to a large extent in the party members’ best interest”. 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993). We return to this point below. 
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the leadership group.” (Hands 1971). At the opposite extreme of the 
spectrum, most studies of parties in the rational choice camp (inspired by, 
and mostly applied to, contemporary parties in the U.S.) conceived party 
leaders as agents of the rank and file. This being understood either in a 
strict principal-agent framework (see Fiorina and Shepsle 1989; Kiewit and 
McCubbins 1991) or in a broader sense, as in Aldrich and Rohde 1998. 
    As we have emphasized before, however, party leaders are never owners 
of the organization; power, instead, resides collectively in the “principals” 
(the backbenchers). On the other side, with the exception of a truly 
“constitutional” stage, incumbent leaders will not be neutral spectators of 
the decisions of the “principals”.
19 These alternative views can thus be 
taken to represent opposite understandings - motivated in part by the 
observation of different realities - about the degree of difficulty for the 
rank and file to effectively coordinate in opposing their leaders; i.e., in 
constituting an effective check to the leader’s power. While this 
coordination is precluded outright in the world of the iron law, it is 
assumed to work without frictions in the framework of Aldrich and Rohde. 
                                                 
19 This observation - which is fairly evident for a vast number of countries - can also, 
according to Bowler, Farrel and Katz 1999, be taken as a feature of U.S. parties: ”While 
it may be true that there is an asymmetry between leaders and followers, given that the 
former have access to patronage and the ability to play divide and rule, whereas the 
latter must overcome problems of collective action and rivalry, leaders can still be 
disciplined by the rank and file. ... At times, party leaders may seem more like generals 
guiding their disciplined troops into the lobbies. Examples such as Margaret Thatcher or 
Newt Gingrich suggest a highly cohesive and willing body of legislators, willing to do or 
die. ... At other times, however, parties are not nearly so compliant. ... The leader keeps 
the party together, but basically by herding people together while letting the party go 
where it wants (e.g. Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the U.S. House; John Major as 
Conservative Party leader in Britain).” 
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    The explicit consideration of this coordination problem is then essential 
to understand the limits of the incumbent’s power over legislators. This is, 
in fact, the approach of the paper. While in the past the assumption of 
common knowledge of preferences has precluded the fruitful analysis of 
this problem,
20 the developments in the global games literature (Carlsson 
and van Damme 1993, Morris and Shin 1998, 2001 and 2003, and Frankel, 
Morris and Pauzner 2003) allows us to study the properties of a unique 
equilibrium. 
    The  different  assumptions  about how the coordination among 
backbenchers is resolved result in markedly different conclusions. In our 
framework, Proposition 1.3 shows that unless the incumbent is protected 
by a supermajority rule for removal, discipline in party votes can be 
entirely attributed to the heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences; i.e., increases 
with heterogeneity of PBs preferences and vanishes in the limit as σ  goes 
to zero. As can be noted from the previous quote of Kiewit and 
McCubbins 1991, this is indeed the same conclusion obtained in the social 
choice framework. This is, however, based on a different mechanic. In their 
case, more heterogeneity allows an agenda setter broader discretion. Our 
notion, instead, emphasizes that when preferences are private information, 
not only it is relevant the existence of opposition, but also that this 
becomes common knowledge among the group members. 
                                                 
20 As radically different behavioral patterns could be sustained as equilibria by self 
fulfilling beliefs. 
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    Moreover, based on the frictionless coordination between backbenchers 
alluded to earlier, Aldrich and Rohde 1995 take this result one step 
further: 
“If there is much diversity in preferences within a party, a 
substantial portion of the members will be reluctant to grant 
strong powers to the leadership, or to resist the vigorous 
exercise of existing powers, because of the realistic fear that 
they may be used to produce outcomes unsatisfactory to the 
members in question” 
 
    This  paper  emphasizes,  instead, a markedly different timing and 
coordination of the collective (heterogeneous) principal. It is not the choice 
of a single PB, we argue, to “resist the vigorous exercise of existing 
powers”. Moreover, except possibly in a truly constitutional stage, both 
resisting the exercise or removing existing powers will be a collective 
choice determined by the common knowledge of opposition to the 
incumbent.
21 
    To sum up, although both views lead to the same conclusion regarding 
the effect of the heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences over the influence of the 
leader, the empirical implications are diametrically opposed. In Aldrich 
and Rohde’s and Cox and McCubbins’ view, the “party effect” will be 
present when there is substantial agreement among party members. In the 
                                                 
21 To some extent, a similar distinction applies to a remark advanced by Calvert 1987, 
who although based on a non-cooperative game, does not model explicitly the “collective 
action” problem of opposing the leader: “[T]he more heterogeneity there is among 
follower’s interests, the less valuable will be the ongoing collective action maintained by 
the leader, because each follower is required to give up more in order for the group to 
accomplish common goals. ... The more heterogeneity among followers, then, the greater 
the temptation for followers to disobey. ” 
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view advanced in this paper, instead, the party effect will be more 
important when the party is more heterogeneous. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
        Legislative Parties can be conceived as teams. In fact, this 
representation seems adequate when intra-party preferences are 
homogeneous, and inter-party preferences are heterogeneous. Party leaders 
here coordinate the actions of the members and enforce plans that further 
the interest of the group. Large, “catch-all” parties in modern democratic 
societies, however, usually cluster individuals with significantly 
heterogeneous views. In this case, conflict about the collective decisions 
emerge. Here the leadership not only solves pure coordination among 
members, but also embodies the resolution of power struggles inside the 
party. Understanding the factors determining the extent of the leader’s 
power over backbenchers thus becomes essential to understanding the 
functioning of legislatures. 
        According to the main views prevailing in American Politics, 
“backbenchers rule”. When internal dissent is high, they opt not to 
delegate power to a party leader. When they are homogeneous, instead, 
they grant powers to a leader, who in turn internalizes the objectives of 
the members. Opposite this view, in which coordination among the 
collective is assumed to be smooth, the analysis following the line of   43
Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy, conceives party leaders as basically 
unchecked by the rank and file. 
    In this paper, we adopt an intermediate view, which in turn enables us 
to approach the relation between leader and “followers” in comparative 
perspective: ultimately, power always resides in the “principals”, but only 
collectively. Thus, how coordination among opposing internal views is 
resolved, is essential to delimit the leader’s power. This is specially 
relevant when resources that can not be delivered on the spot are used to 
influence behavior in the present, as in the case of promises of electoral 
benefits. 
        The central message of this paper is that even if credible per se, 
promises of electoral benefits (e.g., nominations) are insufficient to grant 
significant power to the party leader. Instead, in order to anchor beliefs in 
his favor and make her promises valuable, the incumbent needs either 
provide benefits on the spot, or be protected by a supermajority 
requirement for removal. 
        In particular, when neither of these conditions is present, electoral 
benefits will be used to support the party line only if (ex ante) a majority 
of the party prefers it to the legislative alternative. When endowed with 
pork, instead, the incumbent can make the electoral benefits valuable, 
even when ex ante a majority of the party opposes the party line. This is 
due to the fact that the link between the value of the incumbent’s 
promises, and her ability to overcome contests to her authority, creates a 
complementarity between the allocation of pork to party members and the   44
value of electoral benefits. Moreover, since the multiplier effect of pork 
allocated to party legislators is higher the more exposed the incumbent is 
to internal threats, weaker (less protected) leaders will allocate less pork to 
buy opposition legislators, and more to buy members of their own party. 
        To sum up, the paper provides novel empirical implications for the 
comparative analysis of parties and legislatures. Even after controlling for 
other factors, the effect of nomination power over party discipline will 
depend on (i) the structure of the legislative party’s institutions (ii) the 
heterogeneity of preferences among party backbenchers, and (iii) the 
leader’s capacity to allocate resources on the spot (pork). This might help 
reconcile the theories of party discipline with the observed variation in 
voting behavior across parties in the same country (and thus subject to 
the rules of the same electoral system) and in the same party across time.    
    Moreover, the arguments presented in the paper provide an alternative 
view on why party leaders would “buy” the votes of fellow party members. 
The model predicts a subtle relationship between the allocation of pork, 
the power of nomination, and party’s legislative institutions. More 
vulnerable leaders will enjoy - controlling for the distribution of pork - less 
power from nominations. It is precisely this type of leaders, however, who 
will also tend to allocate more pork to buy the support of members of 
their own party, increasing discipline as a result. 
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1.8  Appendix A 
    Proof of Proposition 1.1. The following definitions will be used here. 
For a given strategy profile of the party vote game {} ξi
P , where each 
ξi
P Rq x :[ , ] { , } Θ× → 0 , let χ() z  denote the proportion of PBs for whom 
ξi
P zr x (;) = , let Γ(; ) θ χ  denote the proportion of PBs that would end up 
supporting x given a particular realization of θ  and an aggregate voting 
mappingχ , and let Π(;) θ χ i  denote the expected net benefit of supporting 
x for a PB with ideal policy θi , givenχ . 
    Proposition 1.1 follows from three lemmas. In Lemma 1.1, we show that 
(i)  {: () } δ π δ =≠ ∅ 0 , and that (ii) with δ δ π δ p ∈ = {: () } 0 , there exists a 
symmetric equilibrium of the party vote game in which ξθ i
P
i rx (; ) =  for all 
i such that θ δ ip ≥   and ξθ i
P
i rq (; ) =  for all i such that θ δ ip < . In Lemma 
1.2, we show that if π δ ()  is strictly increasing {: () } δ π δ = 0  has a single 
element  δp, and this equilibrium is unique. The next step is thus to 
provide a sufficient condition for π δ ()  to be strictly increasing. Note that 
this happens if and only if ep v '( ) ( ) δ δ > for every δ , and that we know 
already that v() ⋅  is a strictly decreasing function. Lemma 1.3 shows that 
while  p() ⋅  is also a decreasing function, it can be made arbitrarily flat by 
reducing the precision of public information (by increasing η). 
Specifically, for any Q>0, there exist a η() Q  such that if ηη > () Q , then   46
|' () | pQ δ < . Then π δ ()  is strictly increasing if ηη δ > (|' () | )
1
e v , and we are 
done. 
 
Lemma 1.1. {: () } δ π δ =≠ ∅ 0 . Let δ δ π δ p ∈ = {: () } 0 . There exists a symmetric 
equilibrium of the party vote game in which ξθ i
P
i rx (; ) =  for all i such that 
θ δ ip ≥   and ξθ i
P
i rq (; ) =  for all i such that θ δ ip < .  
    Proof. Our first task is to show that {: () } δ π δ = ≠ ∅ 0 . Consider the 
points θi vre ≡+
−1()  and θi vre ≡−
−1()  that were defined in Remark 1.2. 
Note that the net payoff of voting for q for PB i in the event that the 
incumbent survives the challenge is given by vr e i () θ − − . Since the net 
payoff of voting for q for PB i is always at least vr e i () θ −−, then 
θθ θ χ ii i >⇒ > Π(;) 0  for any χ . Similarly, since the net payoff of voting 
for  x for PB i is always at least rev i − − () θ  (where the challenge is 
successful for sure), then θ θ θ χ ii i < ⇒ < Π(;) 0 for any χ . It should be 
noted that the points θi  and θi  are well defined, since v() ⋅  is continuously 
decreasing, and  Lim v
i
i θ θ
→−∞ = ∞ () , while  Limv
i
i θ θ
→∞ = −∞ ()  by A1. Now, 
π δ δ δ θ δ χ θδ () (,) ( , ) {} ≡≡ = = ≥ ΠΠ i i 1 . Then the previous argument implies, 
in particular, that π δ () > 0 for δθ > i  and π δ () < 0 for δ θ < i . Since π δ ()   
is continuous, this implies that {: () } δ π δ = ≠ ∅ 0 . Next, let   47
δ δ π δ p ∈= {: () } 0 . To show the existence of the symmetric equilibrium, it 
is now enough to show that Π(; ) {} θ θδ i i 1 ≥  is increasing in θi . But it is easy 
to see from (1) that  P i (, ) δ θ is increasing in θi . Since v i () θ  is decreasing, 
the result follows. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that π δ ()  is strictly increasing. Then {: () } δ π δ = 0  has a 
single element δp, and the equilibrium of Lemma 1.1 is unique.  
 
Proof (Morris and Shin 1998). If π δ ()   is strictly increasing, there is a 
unique δp solving π δ () = 0. We show next that this in turn implies that 
the symmetric equilibrium with switching strategies at δp is the unique 
equilibrium. So consider any equilibrium of the game, and define  
zz z ≡> inf{ | ( ) } χ 0  and zz z ≡< sup{ | ( ) } χ 1  
    Note first that:  
     zzz zz z ≥< < ≥ < < ≥ s u p { |( ) } i n f { |( ) } 01 01 χχ       (1.12) 
   Now, for any zzz ∈> {| () } χ 0 , there is some i for which ξi
P zr x (;) = . This 
is only consistent with equilibrium behavior if the payoff to supporting x 
(for individual i and for anyone else, since they are all identical, ex ante) is 
at least as high as the payoff to supporting q given ideal policy z; i.e., 
Π(; ) z χ ≥ 0. By continuity, this is also true at z; i.e.,   48
Π(; ) z χ ≥ 0       (1.13) 
    Now  consider  the  payoff  Π(; ) {} z
i z 1 θ ≥ . It is clear that, for any z, 
1{} () () θ χ
i z zz ≥ ≥ . But - in general - whenever χ χ () ' () z z ≥  for any z, then 
ΠΠ (; ) (; ' ) zz χ χ ≥ . Hence Π Π (; ) (; ) {} zz
i z 1 θ χ ≥ ≥  for any z, and in particular 
         π χ θ () (; ) (; ) {} zz z
i z ≡ ≥ ≥ Π Π 1       (1.14) 
        Thus combining (1.13) and (1.14) we obtain π() z ≥ 0. Now by 
hypothesis,  π δ ()  is increasing in δ . Since δp is the unique value of δ  
which solves π δ () = 0, this means z p ≥ δ . A symmetric argument 
establishes that z p ≤ δ . Thus zz p ≤≤ δ . This, together with (1.12) implies 
that  zz p == δ . Thus in any equilibrium the aggregate support 
mappingχ , and thus the strategy of every PB, ξi
P, is given by 1{} θδ ip ≥ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 1.3.  p() ⋅  is a decreasing function of δ . Furthermore, for any Q>0, there 
exists a η() Q  such that if ηη > () Q , then |' () | pQ δ < .  
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    That  0 ) ( ' < δ p  follows immediately. And since  | ) ( ' | δ p  is bounded 
above by 
2
η ,  Q p < | ) ( ' | δ  for ηη >= 2/ ( ) QQ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 1.4.  L i m dvrvre
σ µ
→
−− =− + −
0
11 12 () ( [ ] )  
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σ η Lim . Since  ) (σ δ p  is 
bounded (by θi  and θi ), this implies that 
( ) ( ) µ µ µ σ
σ = Φ Φ = − Φ − Φ =
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µ σ δ θ η
δ θ θ θ
δ
i
p e r v  
    Therefore in the limit, as  0 → σ ,  [ ] µ δ 2 1 )
~
( − + = e r v p , so that  
L i m dvrvre
σ µ
→
−− =− + −
0
11 12 () ( [ ] )  
Q.E.D. 
 
Remark 1.5. (i) Suppose that for all i in a given set  0 Ω ,  0 ) , ( = x c i i θ  if  } {i = Ω . 
Then in an equilibrium with no weakly dominated strategies,  0 ) ( = x c f o r  
0 Ω = Ω ; (ii) Suppose that for a given set  0 Ω  there exists  0 Ω ∈ i  such that 
1 ) , ( = x c i i θ  for  } {i = Ω . Then in an equilibrium with no weakly dominated 
strategies  1 ) ( = x c f o r   0 Ω = Ω  
 
Lemma 1.5. There exists a η  such that for all x>q, whenever 
) ( 1 ) ( : x x c η η η η > ⇒ = > .    51
    Proof. (1) Let  ) ( i ov p θ  denote the probability that a PB with ideal point 
i θ  assigns to the incumbent being overthrown in the event of a challenge. 
Then  Ω ∈ i  would challenge the incumbent if and only if:  
{ } ) ; ( ); ( ) ; ( max ) ; ( ) ( i i i i ov q u r e x u q u e p θ θ θ θ + + ≥ +  
    That is, iff  
















θ            (15) 
(2) It is easy to see from here that if  1 ) ( = i ov p θ  for some i (if i believes 
that if the incumbent is challenged, she will be overthrown), then i would 
challenge iff  ) (
1 r vx i
− ≥ θ .
22 It follows from this that for any belief about the 
resolution of a challenge  ) ( i ov p θ  the incumbent will not be challenged 
provided that  ) ( } : min{
1 r v i x i
− ≥ Ω ∈ = θ ω . 
(3) A sufficient condition for a unique voting equilibrium following a 
challenge is that  | ) ( ' | | ) ( ' | δ δ v p e <  for every δ . Since for every δ   (i) 
η δ 2 | ) ( ' | < p  and (ii)  ) ( | ) ( ' | q x v − >α δ  (by A1’), this occurs if 
) ( 2 q x e − <α η  
    Then there will always be a unique equilibrium if  
                                                 
22 To see this, note that  0 ) ( < − + i x v r e θ  if 
i x i r e v θ θ ≡ + <
− ) (
1 , while  0 ) ( > − + i x v r e θ , and 
increases continuously with 
i θ  for 
i i θ θ > . Letting 
c θ  denote the value of 











v r e i x θ , it follows that (i) a PB would challenge iff 
c i θ θ < , and that (ii) 
i c θ θ > , so that  0 ) ( > − + c x v r e θ  and then  ) (
1 r vx c
− = θ ..   52
     ) ( ) (
1 2 r v q x x
e − > ⇒ < − ω α η          (1.16) 
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α η < − + e
r e q 2
1  
    Since the LHS is decreasing in η  and diverges to  ∞ −  as  ∞ → η , for 




Lemma 1.6. For  η η >  there exists a  ℜ ∈ η x ~  such that  η x x x c ~ 1 ) ( ≥ ⇔ =  
    Proof.  Fix  η η > . By Lemma 1.5,  ) ( 1 ) ( x x c η η > ⇒ = . Then for a 
potential challenger with ideal point  i θ , the probability that an active 
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Lim θ µ σ δ θ
θ . Then  c i i i x c θ θ θ < ⇔ =1 ) ; ( , where  i c θ θ >  
is uniquely defined by: 
     ) ( ) , ( c x c p v eP r θ θ δ ≡ +       (1.17) 
    Note that  c θ  so determined is an increasing function of x,  ) (x c θ . This 
result can be obtained totally differentiating (1.17) noting that (i) since 
the LHS is bounded between r and r+e,  0 ) ( > c x v θ  (every challenger prefers 
q to x), (ii) whenever  0 ) ( > i x v θ ,  ) ( ) ( ' i x i x v v θ θ >  for x′>x (for individuals who 
prefer q to x, increasing x increases the payoff of voting for q), (iii)  p δ  is 
increasing in x, and therefore  ) , ( c p P θ δ  is decreasing in x (since the 
probability of a successful challenge increases with x). Also (iv)  ) , ( c p P θ δ  is 
increasing in  i θ  and (v)  ) ( i x v θ  is decreasing in  i θ . 
    For a given x, there will be a challenge if and only if  ω θ ≥ ) (x c . We 
know by the previous lemma that if  α η
e q x
2 + <  then c(x)=0. Thus  ω θ < ) (x c  
for  α η
e q x
2 + < . Since  ) (⋅ c θ  is an increasing function of x,  x x x c ~ 1 ) ( ≥ ⇔ = , 
where x is defined by  ω θ ≡ ) (x c ; i.e., by  ) ( ) ), ~ ( ( ω ω δ x p v x eP r ≡ + . 
Q.E.D.   54
1.9  Appendix B 
    The discussion of Proposition 1.3 in the text emphasizes the change in 
the weight that PBs give to their preferences vis a vis public information as 
a result of changes in the heterogeneity of the party. This note explains in 
some detail why this weight effect, while not reflecting the entire story, is 
dominant in producing the result. 
    As before, let δ denote an arbitrary cutoff for PBs’ strategies. Letting 
βσ η () $ ≡




22 , we write 
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   The derivative of this expression with respect to σ  is: 
      ) )( ( ' ) ( )] ))( ( 1 ( ) )( ( )[ ( ' 0 0 θ θ σ σ β θ δ σ θ δ σ σ β − + − − + − i i k k k     (1.18) 
      Note that the value that individual  i θ  attaches to the incumbent’s 
promises of electoral benefits,  ) , ( i P θ δ , has an inverse relationship with the 
probability that this individual attaches to the incumbent being 
overthrown, and that this probability increases (decreases) with σ  if 
(1.18) is positive (negative). Using this expression, we can separate the 
total effect of increasing σ  on the probability that individual  i θ  attaches 
to the incumbent being overthrown into two components.    
    First, there is a change in the precision of his estimation of the central 
tendency of the party. Given that µ = 12 / , the incumbent is overthrown if   55
the ex post median is not in the incumbent’s coalition; i.e., if  δ θ < . If δ  
is big relative to the weighted average  i k k θ σ θ σ )) ( 1 ( ) ( 0 − +  (with the 
weigths  ) (σ k  fixed), then this is a relatively ”common” event. But a lower 
precision makes ”common” events less likely (in opposition to ”extreme” 
events). Thus, whenever  i k k θ σ θ σ δ )) ( 1 ( ) ( 0 − + > , or equivalently 
0 ) ))( ( 1 ( ) )( ( 0 > − − + − i k k θ δ σ θ δ σ , this precision effect induces individual i 
to consider less likely that the incumbent will be overthrown. 
        Second, there is a change in the weight that i gives to his own 
preferences vis a vis the public information in his estimation of the central 
tendency of the party. As noted in the text, a higher σ  means that 
individual i will attach more weight to the public information and less to 
his own preferences in estimating the central tendency of the party. 
) )( ( ' ) ( ) ( 0 θ θ σ σ β φ − ⋅ i k  reflects the change in the probability that individual 
i θ  attaches to the incumbent being overthrown brought by the change in 
weights between public and private information. Thus a higher σ  will 
make individuals with ideal policies  0 θ θ > i  believe that the central 
tendency of the party is farther away from the policy supported by the 
incumbent (more to the left). Thus, such an individual will attach a higher 
probability to the incumbent being overthrown. 
    Note that for individual i, with ideal policy  i θ , the ”precision” term is 
clearly decreasing in δ , while the ”weight” term is independent of δ .   56
However, for the critical PB, with ideal policy δ , a higher δ  implies both 
a change in the cutoff and a change in his information, and both the 
precision and weight terms depend on the difference between δ  and  0 θ . 
For the critical PB, (1.18) becomes:  
        ) )( ( ' ) ( ) )( ( ) ( ' 0 0 θ δ σ σ β θ δ σ σ β − + − k k      (1.19) 
    The precision term is, as before, decreasing in δ . Even if the estimate 
of the central tendency of the party changes with the preferences of the 
individuals we consider (a more ”right-winged” PB believes ”the party” is 
more ”right-winged”), this only happens with the weight given to their 
preferences vis a vis the public information, and thus is not strong enough 
to compensate the increase in the cutoff. Furthermore, the precision term 
is positive if  0 θ δ <  and negative otherwise. However, for the critical PB 
the weight term is now increasing in δ , and positive if  0 θ δ > .
23 
    Thus, both the precision and weight terms depend on the difference 
0 θ δ − , and (1.19) is positive when  0 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) ( ' 0 > + ⇔ > σ σ β σ σ β θ δ k k , or 
equivalently, iff  
               
) (










               (1.20) 
                                                 
23 This means that according to the precision effect, a less cohesive party would led a 
“left-winged” critical PB to consider more likely that the incumbent will be overthrown 
(and thus the value that he would attach to the incumbent’s promises would decrease). 
According to the weight term, however, a less cohesive party would led a “left-winged” 
critical PB to consider less likely (and not more likely as above) that the incumbent will 
be overthrown (thus reducing the value of her promises).   57
    ; i.e., iff the rate of growth of the ”weight” term outweighs the rate of 
growth of the ”precision” term. Some algebra shows that (20) is indeed 
satisfied, and therefore that the weight terms dominates for the critical 
PB. Therefore (1.19) is positive iff  0 θ δ > , the probability that individual 
δ  attaches to the incumbent being overthrown increases with σ  iff  0 θ δ > , 
and then  pP () (,) δ δ δ ≡  decreases with homogeneity iff  0 θ δ > .  
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Chapter 3 
Judicial Lobbying. The Politics of Labor Law 
Constitutional Interpretation 
 
3.1  Introduction 
    The influence of the Supreme Court on policy-making is undisputed. 
The theoretical literature on interest group influence on politicians,     
however, has put the emphasis solely on the link between lobbying and 
legislative outcomes. In this paper we argue that ignoring the role of the 
court in the policy-making process seriously undermines the analysis of 
lobbying in separation-of-power systems, and build on this literature to 
address this issue. We focus on two intimately related questions. How do 
the interactions between a legislature and a formally independent judiciary 
shape the incentives for interest groups to engage in costly lobbying 
activities? Under what conditions will lobbying effectively influence policy 
outcomes in this setting?  
    The literature on interest group influence on politicians considered two 
broad avenues through which lobbying influences policy outcomes. The 
first class of models encompasses different forms of vote buying in 
legislatures, emphasizing the role of campaign contributions (Denzau and 
Munger 1986; Snyder 1990, 1991; Baron 1994). The second considers what   77
we label informational lobbying: interest groups supply government 
officials with information that induces policy outcomes closer to their 
preferred policies (Ainsworth 1991; Austen-Smith 1993; Austen-Smith and 
Wright 1992; Lohmann 1995; Rasmusen 1993; Sloof and van Winden 
1996). Here again the legislature is taken as the relevant policy-making 
arena, based (implicitly or explicitly) on the fact that the information 
generated by lobbyists can be related in general to the electoral salience of 
a lobbyist’s cause (Ainsworth 1993; de Figuereido 2002).  
    The fact that lobbying influences exclusively the payoffs of legislators 
does not imply, however, that it is sensible to focus on legislatures as the 
relevant policy-making body. To the contrary, as long as the court has 
influence on policy outcomes, the asymmetric impact of lobbying on the 
payoffs of the court and the legislature will shape its effectiveness to affect 
policy in equilibrium, and thus the incentives for interest groups to engage 
in costly lobbying activities in the first place.  
        The overall effect of this asymmetry rests crucially on the relation 
between the judiciary and the legislature. While most judiciaries are 
isolated from direct public approval, they are not immune from elected 
politicians’ influence. Indeed, in most democracies, judicial decisions are 
not the last word. Legislatures can normally reverse the court’s statutory 
rulings with a simple majority, although overturning constitutional rulings 
normally requires a higher level of political consensus. The legislature can, 
furthermore, affect the court’s incentives by imposing sanctions such as   78
court enlargements (Gely and Spiller 1992), impeachments (Iaryczower, 
Spiller and Tommasi 2002), and in some countries simply by not 
reappointing them.
24  
    The court, then, can be effectively constrained in its decisions by the 
majorities in government. This is the essence of the so-called, “separation 
of powers” literature: public opinion alters judicial decisions, but does so 
only indirectly, by affecting the composition and preferred policies of 
members of the legislature (see Segal 1997 and Bergara, Richman and 
Spiller 2003 for a discussion).  
    In this paper we consider the separation-of-powers logic within a model 
of informative lobbying. In this environment, the political constraints 
faced by the court do not reflect public opinion directly, but are driven 
instead by the actions undertaken by an interest group. This approach 
shows that - under certain conditions - previous accounts of interest group 
influence on politicians can still survive in separation of powers systems. 
Furthermore, it reconciles the implications of these theoretical arguments 
with the weak empirical support for the connection between lobbying and 
legislative outcomes (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder 2002).
25  
    The connection between rulings and (informative) lobbying implied by 
the separation of powers argument is not immediate, however. In this 
context, lobbying is strategic information transmission (Austen-Smith 
                                                 
24 This is the case of El Salvador, where justices must be reappointed by the legislature. 
The budget could also serve as an instrument of influence.  See Toma 1991.   
 
25 For studies finding a relation, see Stratman 1992, 1995 and 1996.  See also Snyder 
1992.   79
1993), and as such can only exist if policy is responsive to lobbying efforts 
in equilibrium. Under what conditions will the conclusions derived from 
the extended separation of powers argument be valid? We argue that the 
key feature to answer this question is the extent to which the information 
generated through lobbying can sway decisive majorities in the legislature 
to tighten (relax) the political constraints faced by an anti-interest group 
(pro-interest group) court. As long as policy is responsive to the 
electorate’s preferences in a complete information environment, an interest 
group facing a more favorable disposition of the electorate will always 
choose a higher level of lobbying in equilibrium, thus leading to the link 
between policies and preferences of the electorate that would prevail under 
complete information. When this condition is not satisfied, however, 
lobbying efforts will have no return, and thus lobbying can not exist. Put 
in these terms, the question is whether the legislature is divided enough so 
that neither pro nor anti-interest group preferences of the electorate can 
trigger congressional reactions to lessen judicial independence.  
        In the next sections, we develop this argument formally, and derive 
several empirical implications of our analysis. We then apply this 
framework to study the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation 
in Argentina, and provide an empirical evaluation of our hypothesis using 
data for strikes and Supreme Court’s decisions between 1935 and 1998.   
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3.2  Lobbying Under Separation of Powers 
        This section develops a formal model of informative lobbying under 
separation of powers. After laying out the model, we will first turn to 
consider equilibrium behavior in an environment of complete information. 
The relationship between preferences of the electorate and policy outcomes 
obtained in this symmetric information benchmark will prove to be the 
key element determining the amount and effectiveness of lobbying in the 
private information environment. 
 
3.2.1  The Model 
    There are two individual players, the court and the interest group, and 
a legislature populated by a continuum of legislators with total size 1. To 
fix ideas, in what follows we will refer to the interest group simply as the 
union. Policy space is X = [0,1], and given ideal policy zi, player i has 




) , ( i i i z x z x u − − = .
26 Without loss of generality, we assume that the union’s 
ideal policy is at the right extreme of the policy space, zu= 1, and refer to 
policy x’ as being pro-labor with respect to x’’ whenever x’ > x’’.  
        Legislators and the court differ in their responsiveness to voters. In 
particular, we assume that the court is completely unresponsive to the 
                                                 
26 All results would go through employing Euclidean preferences with the usual 
properties. We present the analysis with specific functional forms to illustrate the nature 
of the results with closed form solutions.    81
position of voters in the policy space, and denote its preferred policy by 
zc∈ X. Legislators, instead, are assumed to be at least partially responsive 
to voters’ stance on the issue. Assuming for simplicity that the 
distribution of voters in the policy space can be completely characterized 
by a single parameter θ ∈ X, we let the ideal policy of legislator j be given 
by zL(θ;βj)≡βj+hθ, where for all j, βj >0 and βj +h < 1. The parameter h 
allows us to capture varying degrees of voters’ influence on legislators’ 
preferred policies. The degree of conflict in the legislature is captured by 
the distribution of points βj across members of the legislature, which we 
describe by the cumulative distribution G(.);  i.e., for any point β, G(β) 
denotes the proportion of legislators for which βj <β. 
    Policy  outcomes  result  from  the interaction of the court and the 
legislature. These two bodies, in fact, share authority over policy-making, 
and their policy decisions can be modified or overturned by one another. 
In most polities, however, the elective body can always ultimately impose 
its will under some sufficiently demanding procedure. This final stage is 
the one we represent in the model: the court chooses a ruling xc∈X, which 
can be reversed by the enactment of new legislation in the legislature with 
the votes of a majority m ∈ [1/2,1] of legislators. We say that a court’s 
ruling is “stable” in the legislature – and therefore final – if there exists no   82
alternative policy that would beat it in a binary choice, and denote the set 
of stable rulings given majority rule m by Sm.   
    Both legislators and the court are uninformed about the realization of 
θ, and have common prior beliefs represented by the cumulative 
distribution function F(⋅) with density f(⋅). We assume that f(⋅) has full 
support (i.e., f(θ)>0 for all θ∈X),  but otherwise allow prior beliefs to be 
completely arbitrary. Informally, this means that legislators can 
potentially be very well (but not perfectly) informed about the realization 
of θ. In contrast, the union is perfectly informed about the realization of θ, 
and can potentially credibly transmit this information through lobbying, 
which takes here the form of strikes and public demonstrations. In 
particular, given a realization θ’, the union can organize an observable 
level a of demonstrations bearing a cost C(a,θ’). We will assume that C(⋅) 
is twice differentiable, that for every realization of the median voter θ, 
C(0,θ)=0, Ca(a,θ)>0, and that Caθ(a,θ)<0; i.e., the marginal cost of lobbying 
is decreasing in the pro-labor stance of the population. For simplicity of 
exposition, we will further assume that C(a,θ)=a(k -θ), k >1.  
        The timing of the game can thus be described as follows: (i)  θ is 
realized and privately observed by the union; (ii)  the union decides a 
publicly observable level of lobbying intensity a; and (iii) the court chooses 
a ruling xc in the set of stable policies in the legislature Sm. An equilibrium   83
Γ={γ(⋅),xc(⋅),F(⋅|a)}  consists of (i)  a strategy for the union, γ : X→R+, 
mapping “types” θ  to levels a of lobbying intensity, (ii) a strategy for the 
court, xc : R+→ S m, mapping observations of lobbying levels a to stable 
rulings  xc∈ S m, and (iii)  beliefs  F( |a)  by the court and the legislators 
satisfying: 
     (a) ) ), ( , ( max arg ) ( θ θ γ a x a U c
R a + ∈
∈  ∀θ∈X;  




 ∀ a∈R+, and  
     (c) whenever a∈ γ(X), F(⋅|a) is determined using Bayes’ rule.  
     
In addition, we supplement this equilibrium concept with a refinement 
restricting beliefs off the equilibrium path known as criterion D1 (Banks 
and Sobel 1987; Cho and Kreps 1987).
27 
 
3.2.2  The Symmetric Information Benchmark 
        Our first step is to characterize, as a benchmark, the symmetric 
information equilibrium. Note that in this case legislators are perfectly 
informed about the value of θ, and the union derives no benefit from 
lobbying, irrespective of the preferences of the electorate. Hence, there will 
                                                 
27 See the appendix for a formal statement. Intuitively, this criterion requires that on 
observing a deviation (an action not taken with positive probability by any type of agent 
in the candidate equilibrium), the uninformed agents (court and union) will infer that the 
deviating party belongs to the class of agents who had the greatest incentive to make the 
observed deviation (Bernheim 1994).   84
be no lobbying in equilibrium. The relationship between preferences of the 
electorate and policy outcomes in the symmetric information environment, 
however, is the key element determining the amount and effectiveness of 
lobbying in the private information environment.  
    We start by characterizing the set of stable policies in the legislature 
given majority rule m. Letting 
m
L β≡  G
-1(1-m) and 
m
H β  ≡ G
-1(m), it is easy to 
see that Sm(θ)=[zL(θ;
m
L β  ), zL(θ;
m
H β )]. That is, 
m
L β  is the critical legislator for 
a pro-labor coalition, in the sense that any policy x to the left of her 
preferred policy would be replaced by a more pro-labor policy. Similarly, 
m
H β  is the critical legislator for an anti-labor coalition.  
    Note that βL(m) ≤ βH(m), and βL(m) = βH(m) only with simple majority 
rule (m=1/2), in which case Sm(θ) collapses to the preferred policy of the 
median voter in the legislature, and the court has no policy making power. 
It follows that for m > 1/2, the set of possible court’s ideal policies that 
would be stable given θ  has positive measure.
28  
    The court will then select its ideal policy unless it is constrained either 
for being “extremely” pro-labor or anti-labor in relation to the relevant 
players in the legislature. In particular, since the preferred policy of every 
                                                 
28 Note that this framework allows us to accommodate different procedures for legislative 
approval.  For example, consider the case in which a policy has to be approved by two 
collective bodies (House and Senate, a committee and the floor, etc) by simple majority. 
In this case, βL and βH would be given by the median voters in each chamber, S(θ) would 
not in general be a singleton, and the court would face a nontrivial strategic problem. To 
simplify the presentation, however, we continue with the benchmark interpretation of a 
unicameral legislature with a supermajority rule unless it is otherwise noted, and drop the 
m subscript when there can be no confusion.   85
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In the case depicted in Figure 1, z(0;βH)<zc<z(1;βL). The court is perceived as “pro-labor” for 
θ<θ0. Here the constraint is binding and xc
PI(θ)=zL(θ;βH). Similarly, the court is perceived as 
“anti-labor” for θ>θ1, and xc








































































legislator is strictly increasing in θ, a higher value of θ  results in a pro-
labor shift of the entire set of stable policies. A court with a fixed policy 
preference  zc may then become a “pro-labor” court for a legislature 
observing a low realization θ’ (zc > zL(θ’;βH )), or an ”anti-labor” court for a 
legislature observing a high realization θ’’(zc < zL(θ’’;βL  )). Figure 3.1 
depicts in bold the resulting court’s equilibrium rulings as a function of 
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        The two parallel lines in the figure represent the preferences of the 
critical legislators as a function of the state of nature, zL(θ ; βL )=βL+hθ  
and zL(θ ; βH )= βH+hθ . For each θ, the set of stable policies S(θ) is the 
segment between these lines, the interval [βL+hθ, βH+hθ] in the vertical 
axis. If for some θ  the court’s ideal point zc is in S(θ), the court will be 
able to rule according to its preferred policy, facing no effective constraint. 
In the example depicted in the figure, this occurs for all states between the 
(interior) points θ0 and θ1. In this region therefore the court’s equilibrium 
ruling is represented by the flat portion of the bold line. For θ < θ0, 
however,  S(θ)  is entirely below zc. This means that if it were common 
knowledge among legislators that public sentiment is strongly anti-labor, 
the ideal point of the court would not survive the challenge of a more anti-
labor legislation. The best choice for the court in such states is therefore to 
enact the most pro-labor stable ruling; i.e., βH+hθ. Thus, for θ<θ0, the 
bold line representing court’s equilibrium rulings coincides with βH+hθ. 
Similarly, for θ>θ1, S(θ) is entirely above zc.  In this subset of states the 
legislature is too pro-labor compared to the court, and thus the best choice 
for the court in such states is to enact the most “anti-labor” stable ruling; 
i.e., βL+hθ. Proposition 3.1 below summarizes the preceding discussion.  
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Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the realization of θ is public information. Then (i) 






Specifically, θ0=0 for zc<βH, θ0=1 for zc
 >βH+h, and θ0= (zc-βH)/h otherwise. θ1 
is similarly defined, with βL in place of βH. 
 
        The court is thus effectively constrained by the legislature for some 
realizations of public opinion when the set  } : { 1 0 θ θ θ θ θ ≥ ∨ ≤ = K  is non-
empty. In other words, the court will be able to rule its preferred policy 
independently of public opinion only if this policy is both (i)  pro-labor 
relative to the preferences of the critical legislator for a pro-labor coalition 
before a pro-labor electorate (zc  > zL(1;βL  )=  βL+h)  and  (ii)  anti-labor 
relative to the preferences of the critical legislator for an anti-labor 
coalition before an anti-labor electorate (zc < zL(0 ;βH )= βH ). Note that, as 
in Gely and Spiller 1990, this condition is more likely to be satisfied when 
there is significant dissent in the legislature (the critical legislators for pro-  88
labor and anti-labor coalitions are far apart, βL<<βH) and legislators are 
not too responsive to public opinion (h is small).  
    Moreover, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that, in general, the size of K 
increases with βL and decreases with βH. Thus, the set of realizations of 
public opinion for which the court is effectively constrained is always 
smaller the higher dissent in the legislature is. Proposition 3.1 does not 
imply, however, that the size of  K  should be generically lower the less 
responsive legislators are to public opinion. To see this, note that the set 
of values of θ  for which a sincere ruling by the court would not face an 
anti-labor reversal increases with h (the court benefits, in this regard, from 
a more eager response of legislators to public opinion). Hence, the overall 
effect of legislators’ responsiveness to public opinion on judicial 
independence depends on the relative position of the court in the policy 
space.  
 
3.2.3  Informative Lobbying 
    The previous analysis showed that when the court is constrained for 
some (publicly known) preferences of the electorate, an increase in θ  
induces a more pro-labor ruling, and thus, a more pro-labor policy 
outcome in equilibrium. The first goal of this section is to show that, when 
policy-makers are uncertain about the realization of θ, lobbying by the 
interest group restores the complete information mapping between the   89
preferences of the electorate and policy outcomes. Suppose, for example, 
that the court would be constrained for some known preferences of the 
electorate. Then this result says that in the presence of lobbying, the court 
would be forced to adjust its behavior to reflect this constraint, even when 
it would be independent to rule according to its preferred policy given the 
prior beliefs of uninformed legislators. Similarly, suppose instead that the 
court would be independent to rule according to its preferred policy for 
some known preferences of the electorate. Then the court would indeed be 
able to rule freely in the presence of lobbying, even if it would be 
constrained given the prior beliefs of uninformed legislators. The result is 
stated formally in the next proposition (Lemma 3.1 in the Appendix 
provides a detailed characterization of equilibrium strategies):  
 
Proposition 3.2. In the unique D1 equilibrium (i) Lobbying γ(θ) increases with θ 
in K, and does not change with θ in [θ0,θ1]; (ii) Court’s (stable) rulings xc(a) 
satisfy xc(γ(θ))=xc
PI(θ) for every θ, where xc
PI(θ) is given in proposition 1. In 
particular, the pro-labor tendency of rulings increases with the level of strikes; 
i.e., xc(a) is increasing in a. 
 
    That is, in equilibrium the level of strikes will reflect the preferences of 
the electorate up to the extent that this information can influence a 
binding constraint for the court (and thus policy outcomes). We say, then, 
that strikes are effectively fully informative. As long as (informed) policy   90
is responsive to the electorate’s preferences, two union types facing 
different pro-labor dispositions of the electorate will always choose 
different levels of lobbying, allowing the reproduction of the complete 
information link between policies and the preferences of the electorate.  
        This does not imply, however, that the equilibrium will necessarily 
involve transmission of information. In fact, lobbying will be completely 
unresponsive to the preferences of the electorate if (and only if) the court 
is unconstrained for every possible realization of θ.  Conversely, there will 
be a complete separating equilibrium if (and only if) the court is 
constrained for every realization of public preferences. That is, only if the 
court’s ideal policy is “extremely anti-labor” (i.e., zc < βL), or “extremely 
pro-labor” (i.e., zc > βH+h) by Proposition 3.1 standards. 
    Figure  3.2  illustrates  graphically  the results in Proposition 3.2. The 
upper panel (Figure 3.2.a.) plots the mappings from the electorate’s pro-
labor disposition θ  to court rulings and lobbying levels in equilibrium. 
The result that strikes are effectively fully informative in equilibrium 
implies that the mapping from θ  to court rulings is equivalent to the 
complete information behavior illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2.a. adds 
to Figure 3.1 the representation of equilibrium strikes as a function of θ. 
The union’s equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing in the subset of the 
state space in which the electorate’s pro-labor disposition would trigger (if 
publicly known) a reaction by the legislature to a court’s ruling, K, and   91








































FIGURE 2.a. Lobbying and Court Rulings as a Function of theta  
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   Figure 3.2.b  Court’s Rulings as a Function of the Level of Lobbying   
         Figure 3.2.a  Lobbying and Court Rulings as a Function of θ   
flat in the interval [θ0,θ1]. For every realization of the state θ, the 
mappings in Figure 3.2.a. provide a pair of lobbying and court rulings.  
The lower panel (Figure 3.2.b) plots all pairs obtained in this manner, 
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    Proposition 3.2 allows us to study the response of the expected level of 
strikes and pro-labor rulings to changes in the composition of the 
legislature. Note that for our purposes changes in the composition of the 
legislature are relevant only to the extent that they affect the boundaries 
of the stable set of policies in the legislature, zL(θ;βL  )=βL+hθ  and 
zL(θ;βH)=βH+hθ. Moreover, recall from the analysis of the symmetric 
information benchmark that the set of realizations of public opinion for 
which the court is effectively constrained is always smaller the higher 
dissent in congress is. That is, in general, the size of K increases with βL 
and decreases with βH. Proposition 3.2 then directly implies the following 
result, and its corollary:  
 
Proposition 3.3.  A pro-labor shift in the preferred policy of the critical 
legislator’s for a pro-labor coalition βL (anti-labor coalition, βH), increases the 
expected pro-labor tendency of the court’ rulings level Eθ [xc], and increases 
(reduces) the expected level of lobbying, Eθ [γ].  
 
Corollary 3.1. A mean preserving increase in the size of the set of stable policies 
in Congress reduces the expected level of strikes in equilibrium 
 
        Proposition 3.3 also has direct implications over the response of 
equilibrium outcomes to changes in court’s preferences. First, it is clear   93
from the previous analysis that the expected level of pro-labor rulings will 
increase following a pro-labor change in the court’s preferences unless the 
court is constrained for every realization of θ both preceding and following 
this change. The change in the expected level of strikes is nevertheless 
ambiguous. This should come as no surprise, however, since for this 
purpose, increasing xc with βL and βH given is qualitatively similar as 
simultaneously reducing both βL and βH taking xc as given, and we know 
from Proposition 3.3 that βL and βH have opposite effects on the expected 
level of strikes. 
        Similarly, we know from the analysis of the symmetric information 
benchmark that the overall effect of legislators’ responsiveness to public 
opinion on judicial independence depends on the relative position of the 
court in the policy space. This implies that any relation we could obtain 
between lobbying and the responsiveness of legislators to public opinion 
will also necessarily depend on the relative position of the court in the 
policy space. 
 
3.2.4  Empirical Implications 
    The model has direct and empirically refutable implications. The first 
two implications are unique to this model.  First, Proposition 2.2 states 
that in equilibrium the level of “pro-labor” judicial decisions is increasing 
in the extent of the union’s political activity. Thus, we should observe   94
more  “pro-labor” decisions when facing a higher level of union strikes.   
Second, the expected level of lobbying decreases the more effective the 
separation of powers between court and legislature is (the more divided 
the legislature is on the relevant issues).   Specifically, as the corollary to 
Proposition 3.3 points out, we expect the level of strikes to be decreasing 
in the amplitude of the set of stable policies in the legislature.  
        Our model also has more standard separation of powers empirical 
implications.  As in most separation of powers models, Proposition 3.3 
implies that the equilibrium level of “pro-labor” judicial decisions depends 
on the political composition of the legislature (Spiller and Gely 1994; 
Bergara, Richman and Spiller 2002).  In equilibrium, a more “pro-labor” 
legislature will trigger more “pro-labor” decisions provided that the court 
is effectively constrained by the legislature. Thus, our model provides 
unique, as well, as standard empirical implications concerning separation 
of power models.  The unique implications constitute direct tests of the 
signaling value of interest groups lobbying.  
 
3.3  The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional 
Interpretation in Argentina 
    In this section we apply the model to study the politics of labor law 
constitutional interpretation in Argentina, and provide an evaluation of   95
the empirical implications of our model using data for strikes and Supreme 
Court’s decisions between 1935 and 1998.  
        Though far from constituting a comprehensive test of the theory 
developed in this paper, this case presents a relevant and natural 
application of the proposed framework. While formally independent, 
Argentina’s Supreme Court has faced both implicit and explicit threats 
from the political powers, and has adjusted its behavior accordingly (see 
Helmke 2002, and Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi 2002).
 Moreover, the 
centralized control by unions of an institutional structure allowing the 
effective organization of large demonstrations have both broadened their 
scope of interest from industry level to national labor policies, and 
transformed organized demonstrations into instruments of political 
influence.  
        In this environment, the relevant assumptions we impose to the 
analysis translate into the following mild requirements. First, legislators 
are at least somewhat responsive to (but not perfectly informed about) the 
preferences of the electorate.
29 Second, the union knows the cost of 
organizing public demonstrations, and this cost decreases the more 
intensely voters oppose anti-labor legislation. As we have shown in the 
previous section, under this assumption the observed level of protests will 
                                                 
29 This will generally be the case even in systems as the Argentinean, where legislators’ 
reelection rates are low and elections depend on the nomination to party lists. First, the 
electoral connection constitutes an asset not only for the national legislature, but also for 
other elective posts such as governors, majors and subnational legislatures. Second, even 
if party bosses have authority over the composition of electoral lists, their position within 
the party rests on the support of the members of the organization, and in particular of 
current party legislators. Thus, they will not be able, in general, to ignore their 
preferences (see Chapter 1).   96
transmit valuable information about the preferences of the electorate to 
politicians in equilibrium, even if the union’s slogans constitute a biased 
(and thus uninformative) representation of society’s interests. 
 
3.3.1  The Political Environment 
        According to our theoretical argument, the relative position of the 
court with respect to the set of stable policies in the legislature is a major 
factor determining both court rulings and the level of lobbying. Our first 
task to define the relevant independent variables, then, is to obtain an 
assessment of the distribution of preferences within congress along a pro-
labor/anti-labor policy space.  
        Throughout most of the 20
th century, Argentina was a strong 
presidential system with two dominant political parties (McGuire 1995; 
Manzetti 1993; Jones 2002) characterized by a relatively sharp contrast in 
their stance with respect to labor policies and the regulation of organized 
labor (Rotondaro 1971; Torre 1983; Fernandez 1988; McGuire 1997). 
While all presidents have sought to some extent support from (at least 
some fractions of) the unions, the strong association between unions and 
the Peronist party and the Peronist/anti-Peronist division of Argentine 
society defined Argentina’s political reality in the second part of the 20
th 
century.  Relying on these facts, we classify each president (and its party 
in congress) as pro or anti-labor, and use this classification, along with the   97
partisan composition of the legislature, to obtain an assessment of the pro-
labor composition of the Argentine Congress.  
    We start by classifying Argentina’s presidents between 1935 and 1997 
as pro-labor or anti-labor, following to the greater extent possible the 
“stylized facts” presented by previous studies.  Presidents Farrel, Peron, 
and all Presidents who governed representing the Peronist Party 
(Campora, Lastiri, and Martinez in 1973- 1976, Menem between 1989 and 
1999) were classified as pro-labor. President Frondizi (1958-1962) did not 
represent the Peronist party but was also classified as pro-labor.
30 The 
remaining presidents (mainly military dictators and democratic presidents 
representing the UCR Party) were classified as anti-labor.  
        Taking this classification as given, we use parties’ representation in 
Congress to compute the distribution of preferences for the upper and 
lower chambers in each period t,  ) (⋅
U
t G  and  ) (⋅
L
t G . We assume, first, that 
legislative parties are perfectly cohesive, and that parties in the opposition 
have the opposite stance in the labor policy space than the president’s 
party. The distribution of imputed preferences for legislators of chamber j 




t x G ω = ) (  for  1 0 < ≤ x  and  1 ) 1 ( =
j
t G , 
where 
j
t ω  denotes the proportion of seats held by the anti-labor’s party in 
chamber  j in period t (we assume here that  1 =
j
t ω  during periods of 
military interruptions to the democratic regime).  
                                                 
30 Peronism was banned from participating in the 1958 elections, and President Frondizi 
was elected with the explicit support of Peron (see, for example, McGuire 1997).   98
    To complement the assumption of parties being perfectly cohesive, we 
also consider noisy identifications of legislative parties with the president. 
Specifically, for both the anti-labor and the pro-labor party, we assume 
that the proportions of party members with ideal policy closer to the 
extreme anti-labor (0) and pro-labor (1) policies are given by a beta 
distribution  ) , ( β α B  with support in [0,1], for β=1 and α=0.1 and α=0.2. 
31 
With this assumption, then, the distribution of preferences of legislators in 
chamber  j in a democratic period t is given by 






t − Β − − + Β = α α ω ω α .  
 
3.3.2  Dependent Variables 
    The dependent variables in our study are Supreme Court’s pro-labor 
rulings and the amount of strikes organized by the union. Specifically, we 
define the variable strikes as the number of strikes per year. 
32 Rulings are 
based on labor and social security cases involving the constitutionality of 
government norms that were decided by the Supreme Court in Argentina 
                                                 
31 This family of distributions is stochastically increasing in α and reduces to the uniform 
distribution when α = β = 1. Thus, the “noise” in the identification of the legislative 
parties with the President increases with α. 
 
32 Since this data was not available from a single source for the entire period of our 
database (1935 – 1998), we selected what we considered to be the best possible source in 
our sample and generated the remaining data using the percent variation in the next best 
available series. The most comprehensive and reliable source is O’Donnel 2000, covering 
the period 1955-1972.  For 1935 – 1955 we used data from Rotondaro 1971, which 
independently covers the period 1935 – 1968. For the period 1972 – 1998 we used Torre 
1983, Fernandez 1988, and Nueva Mayoria 2001. 
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between 1935 and 1998.
 33  Within this universe of cases, we define the 
categorical variable pro-labor ruling to take the value one (zero) if a court 
ruling  (i)  upholds a government norm during a pro-labor (anti-labor) 
presidency or (ii) challenges a government norm during an anti-labor (pro-
labor) presidency.  
 
3.3.3  Independent Variables 
    The pro-labor composition of the legislature is relevant for our purposes 
for two reasons. First, the appointment of a president’s nominee to the 
Supreme Court requires the approval of the senate (by simple majority 
until 1994). Thus, the pro-labor composition of the senate affects directly 
the preferences of the court. To reflect the influence of the senate in a 
simple manner, we use the midpoint between the ideal point of the 
president and the median voter of the senate at the time of appointment 
as an estimate of the pro-labor disposition of each justice. The pro-labor 
                                                 
33 By norms, we mean laws, presidential decrees, administrative decisions and resolutions. 
Cases in which the constitutionality of a lower court decision was questioned 
(arbitrariedad), and cases in which the constitutionality of the interpretation of a norm 
by a lower court was questioned, but not the norm in itself, were excluded. Moreover, we 
also excluded those cases in which the supreme court decided not to pronounce over the 
constitutionality of the challenged norm alleging formal or technical reasons. Finally, to 
avoid duplications in substance arising from the fact that the Argentine supreme court 
does not have the ability to determine a law as unconstitutional per se, but rather has to 
deal with the unconstitutionality of its application to a particular case (person), we limit 
the pool of cases to those published in extenso in La Ley, the main judicial publication in 
Argentina.    100
disposition of the court in each period, pro-labor court, is then defined as 
the policy preference of the court’s median justice.
34 
    Second, the pro-labor compositions of the upper and lower chambers 
determine the set of stable policies in the legislature in any given period. A 
ruling is stable if it does not trigger a response by a pro or an anti-labor 
coalition in the legislature. Since until 1994 Argentina’s Constitution 
allowed Congress to enlarge the Supreme Court with a simple law, we will 
focus primarily on the critical legislators for simple majority rule in a 
bicameral legislature. These are denoted pro-labor critical and anti-labor 
critical and defined – for both the cohesive and noisy representations of 
legislative parties - as the minimum and maximum among the median 
legislators of the upper and lower chambers.
35  
    The equilibrium level of pro-labor rulings and strikes depend, however, 
on the relative position of the court with respect to the set of stable 
policies in the legislature. Consider first the court. Justices will rule based 
solely on their preferences provided that their preferred policies are stable 
policies in congress, and will otherwise adjust their rulings so that these 
fall within the set of acceptable policies in the legislature. As a result, 
                                                 
34 We do this for the cohesive and noisy representations of the legislature. Note that the 
median voter in the Senate at the time of appointment, T, is computed from the 
distributions ) (x G
U
T and ) ; ( α x G
U
T  respectively, and that therefore pro-labor court changes 
with each specification. 
 
35 We do however also include a model specified for two thirds supermajority required in 
both chambers. Denoting the critical legislator for a pro-labor (anti-labor) coalition in 
chamber  j=U,L   by 
j
L β  (
j
H β ), the critical legislator for pro-labor and anti-labor 








H β β , respectively.   101
court’s preferences will influence Justices’ behavior directly only to the 
extent that the court is unconstrained. If instead an anti-labor court is 
constrained by the legislature, changes in the critical legislator for a pro-
labor coalition - and not in court’s preferences - will influence court’s 
decisions. Similarly, if a pro-labor court is constrained by the legislature, 
changes in the critical legislator for an anti-labor coalition will influence 
court’s decisions. We then define the following variables. Pro-labor 
constraint equals pro-labor critical if an anti-labor court is constrained (if 
pro-labor court < pro-labor critical) and zero otherwise. Similarly, anti-
labor constraint equals anti-labor critical if a pro- labor court is constrained 
(if pro-labor court > anti-labor critical) and zero otherwise. Finally, court 
unconstrained is defined as pro-labor court if the court is unconstrained, 
and zero otherwise.  
    The union, on the other hand, will only engage in lobbying if policy 
outcomes are responsive to lobbying efforts. This implies that the expected 
level of lobbying (strike activity) increases the more constrained the court 
is, and decreases (Corollary 3.1) with the length of the set of stable 
policies in the legislature. We then define the variable binding as the 
distance between pro-labor court and the set of stable policies, and length 
as the distance between pro-labor critical and anti-labor critical.  
    We conclude by defining two control variables related to the political 
environment. First, up to now we have treated military governments as   102
the equivalent to completely unified democratic governments; i.e, 
governments in which the president’s party controlled all seats in both 
houses. We want to allow, however, for possible additional effects of 
military governments on both rulings and strikes. To do so, we introduce 
the categorical variable dictator, which takes the value 1 in periods of 
interruptions to the democratic regime.  
    We also introduce the categorical variable post-Peron, which takes the 
value 1 for observations dated after President’s Peron initial departure 
from office in September, 1955. As Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi 2002 
already showed, the first administration of President Peron marked a 
defining moment in the relation of the polity to the judiciary.  Figure 3.3 
also shows, what many have already mentioned (e.g., McGuire 1997), that 
it also marked a defining moment in the organization of the labor 
movement, and in the extent of use of strikes. The categorical variable 
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3.3.4  Estimation 
As indicated by Proposition 3.2, court’s pro-labor rulings are increasing in 
the observed level of strikes. The equilibrium level of strikes is in itself a 
response to the political environment and the relative positioning of the 
court in the (labor) policy space. It is not, however, a function of actual 
rulings by the court, which only happen after the level of strikes is 
observed. Specifically, for our main specification (model I), the variables in 
the right hand side of the pro-labor ruling equation are given by court 
unconstrained, pro-labor constraint, anti-labor constraint, post-Peron, and   104
dictator. The variables in the right hand side of the strikes equation are 
given by length, binding, pro-labor court, post-Peron, dictator, along with 
three lagged observations of the growth of GDP, included as controls.  
    Thus, the model to be estimated is a triangular system of two equations, 
and a fully recursive system if in addition the variance-covariance matrix is 
also diagonal. In this case, the disturbances are uncorrelated and the 
system can be consistently and efficiently estimated equation by equation 
(see Greene 2000, 678). Our first step thus is to test this hypothesis for 
Model I (with the data arranged in a case-based unit of analysis)   
employing the test suggested by Breusch and Pagan 1980 (see Greene   
2000, 621). We find that the diagonal matrix hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, so estimation of the system by ordinary least squares equation-
by-equation is indeed appropriate.  
        It should be noted, however, that OLS estimates can be improved 
upon. Since pro-labor ruling is a categorical variable, we use a logit model 
to estimate the conditional probability of a pro-labor ruling.  Moreover, 
since the data for the number of strikes is only available in annual terms, 
the estimation of Supreme Court’s decisions uses the number of strikes in 
the year in which the Supreme Court decided the case. Given this 
constraint, and the fact that we can estimate the strikes equation 
separately, we averaged the values of the remaining variables through each 
year, and estimated the strikes equation using annual data.    105
Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2)
0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 **  0.003 ** 0.003 ** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1.437 *** 2.829 *   1.856 *** 3.799 ** 
(0.493) (1.497) (0.551) (1.591)
1.144     1.128     1.147     2.414 **  2.955 **  3.626 ** 
(0.734) (0.820) (0.968) (1.135) (1.299) (1.568)
1.565 *** 1.927 *** 2.307 *** 3.126 ***
(0.496) (0.610) (0.627) (0.850)
-1.558 ***  -1.449 *** -1.328 *** -1.891 *** -1.728 *** -1.402 *** 
(0.506) (0.462) (0.473) (0.620) (0.554) (0.554)
1.064 **  1.027 **  1.083 ** 
(0.541) (0.480) (0.500)
-0.346     -0.449     -0.637     -0.460     -0.847 *   -1.470 ** 
(0.405) (0.452) (0.548) (0.423) (0.509) (0.703)
Prob > LR chi 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Prob > Pearson chi 
2 0.019 0.018 0.025 0.033 0.027 0.029
Area u / ROC curve 0.673 0.674 0.676 0.682 0.698 0.709
Correctly Classified 0.616 0.648 0.648 0.607 0.646 0.674
TABLE 3.1. Logit Regressions. Dependent Variable: Pro-Labor Rulings
Goodness of Fit
Note: For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and standard deviation (in 
















    Table 1 presents the results for a logit specification of the pro-labor 
rulings equation in Model I under the cohesive and noisy representations 
of the legislature. The table also presents the results of Model II, which 















        The results are consistent with the predictions of the model. As in 
separation of power models, the probability of a pro-labor ruling increases 
with the pro-labor disposition of unconstrained courts (court 
unconstrained) and when a binding constraint for a pro-labor court is   106
relaxed (an increase in anti-labor constraint).
36 The probability of a pro-
labor ruling also increases when a binding constraint for an anti-labor 
Court is tightened. The coefficient of anti-labor constraint, however, is 
only statistically significant at low levels of confidence for Model I (12 % 
and 17 %), although it is significant at the 5 % level when we only include 
observations for democratic periods (Model II).   
    Moving towards the more unique implications of our model, we find 
that, consistent with Proposition 3.2, pro-labor rulings increase with the 
level of strikes. This result stands for both the cohesive and noisy 
representations of the legislature, and whether we consider all cases or 
only those decided in democratic periods. In particular, setting initially the 
value of all variables at their sample average, a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of strikes - 152.6 and 180.4 for the standard and 
democratic case-based databases - increases the probability of a pro-labor 
ruling by 12.1 %, 12.9 % and 13.2 % in the alternative representations of 
Model I, and by 12.6 % , 12.5 % and 12.4 % in Model II.  
    We also find that the coefficient of the categorical variable dictator is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 % level. Taking into 
consideration that (i) all dictatorships following Peron were classified as 
anti-labor governments, and that (ii) dictatorships were treated as 
perfectly unified democratic governments in the definitions of pro-labor 
                                                 
36 It should be noted that the relative position of the court and the critical legislators in 
the legislature varies with each specification. Thus, while there are no instances in which 
the political constraint is binding for a pro-labor court for “cohesive” parties, this event 
does indeed occur under a noisy representation of the legislature.   107
critical and anti-labor critical, we interpret this result as saying that 
dictatorships pose a lesser threat to the court than perfectly unified 
democratic governments.
37  
    Table 3.2 presents the results of four exercises that complement the 
previous analysis. In Model III, we consider the model under the 
assumption that the relevant majority determining the constraints for the 
court is a supermajority of two thirds of the members of each chamber. 
We find that the coefficients of strikes and the preferences of 
unconstrained courts (court unconstrained) are still statistically significant 
at the 1 % confidence level. The effect of the political constraints is more 
difficult to evaluate, however. First, rulings are always pro-labor when the 
constraint for an anti-labor court is binding. In this case, these 
observations carry no statistical information with respect to the likelihood 
function and have to be removed from the estimation.
38 On the other side 
of the constraint, however, there are no instances of a pro-labor court 
being constrained by congress in the cohesive representation of the 
legislature, and the coefficient of anti-labor constraint is not statistically 
significant in the noisy representation.   
 
 
                                                 
37 We also find that the probability of a pro-labor ruling decreases after Peron’s 
presidency. We conjecture that this result might capture the reaction to the impressive 
development of pro-labor legislation during Peron’s government.  
 
38 This is not to say that this variable is not relevant for the outcomes, but instead that 
their contribution can be replaced by the rule: “if a supermajority constraint is binding 
for an anti-labor court, the court will rule in favor of labor.”   108
Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1)
0.004 *** 0.003 **  0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.023     0.025     0.004 **  0.004 ** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002)
1.854 *** 1.951 *** 1.066 *** 2.282 *** 1.920 *** 3.785 ** 
(0.549) (0.415) (0.379) (0.708) (0.615) (1.622)
0.959     0.735     2.129 **  2.190 **  3.249 ** 
(0.718) (0.749) (0.916) (1.011) (1.414)
0.481     1.210 *** 2.486 *** 2.523 ***
(0.367) (0.452) (0.760) (0.744)
-1.942 *** -1.205 **  -1.414     -1.327 *** -1.751 *** -1.574 ***
(0.602) (0.530) (0.482) (0.452) (0.621) (0.579)
0.675     0.678     1.666 **  1.941 ***
(0.443) (0.435) (0.714) (0.717)
-0.540     -0.825 *   -0.136     -0.188     -1.304     -1.555     -0.649     -1.080 ** 
(0.429) (0.432) 0.36316 (0.427) (0.924) (0.975) (0.519) (0.642)
Database
Prob > LR chi 
2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000
Prob > Pearson chi 
2 0.039 0.144 0.024 0.015 0.104 0.088 0.073 0.049
Area u / ROC curve 0.670 0.751 0.669 0.659 0.769 0.761 0.671 0.698
Correctly Classified 0.593 0.686 0.616 0.625 0.754 0.754 0.592 0.643
a Positive values of pro-labor constraint predict pro-labor rulings (PLR=1) perfectly in models III, VI (observations were droppped). 
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Note: For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and standard deviation (in parenthesis, below). * p < 0.1 ;               
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Democracy, N=172 Standard, N=315
Pre-Peron
Model III Model IV Model V
 
     Model IV considers an alternative method to capture the preferences of 
the court. While the appointment of president’s nominees to the Supreme 
Court requires the approval of the senate, it can be argued that the Senate 
has only a formal role in this procedure. In this case, our measure of 
court’s preferences would be improved by simply removing the influence of 
the Senate. We do this in Model IV, assuming that the pro-labor stance of 
each justice is equal to that of the nominating president. The results show 
that Model I performs better than Model IV according to the goodness of 
fit indicators. The gain, however, is only slight, suggesting that not much 
has been gained by considering the role of the senate in appointments to 
the Supreme Court. Model V considers our main specification in the 
period preceding President Peron. Since up to this point in time unions 
had a much more restrictive organizational capability, we do not expect 
strikes to be significantly informative about the preferences of a wide 
electorate. Consistent with this description, we find that although the 
estimated coefficient of strikes remains positive in both specifications, its 
statistical significance drops substantially.  
    Finally, Model VI considers the strategic defection hypothesis proposed 
by Helmke 2002. According to Helmke 2002, the political constraints faced 
by the court in a given period can fall short of accounting for the entire 
range of incentives faced by the court. The strategic defection hypothesis 
argues that Justices’ behavior reflects not only the effect of current 
political constraints, but also their anticipation of the political constraints   110
they will face in the future. To evaluate this hypothesis in the current 
setting, we consider the specification of the main model in a restricted 
sample, including only those rulings decided one year before a change of 
president. We find that the precision of the estimates improves 
consistently, lending support to this argument.   
        Table 3.3 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the 
strikes equation. The independent variables in Model I include length, 
binding, pro-labor court, post-Peron, dictator, along with three lagged 
observations of the growth of GDP, included as controls. The results are 
again consistent with the empirical implications of the theory. First, 
according to Proposition 3.3 (and its corollary), we expect the level of 
strikes to increase the more constrained the court is, and decrease with the 
size of the stable set (the “pooling” area). These implications are in fact 
supported by the evidence, as indicated by the coefficients of binding and 
length.
39  
    Table 3.3 also shows that unions were less combative during military 
governments, and that (as Figure 3.3 anticipated) the organization of the 
labor movement since Peron resulted in a higher capacity of unions to 
engage in political demonstrations.
40 
 
                                                 
39 We note, however, that length was highly collinear with pro-labor court, post-Peron 
and dictator in the cohesive representation of legislative parties, and was dropped from 
the analysis. 
 
40 We also find that the level of strikes decreases the more pro-labor the court is. As 
noted in the previous section, however, the empirical implication regarding the position of 
the court is ambiguous in general. Thus this finding does not provide evidence in favor or 
against the model.   111
Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2)
  Length 
b -180.8 **  -346.0 *** -212.5 **  -421.2 ***
(85.3) (126.4) (89.1) (133.9)
Binding 223.3 *** 168.6 **  145.3 *** 219.6 *** 159.6 **  130.5 ** 
(83.1) (63.7) (51.3) (82.2) (65.5) (54.3)
Pro-Labor court -106.6 **  -169.0 *** -144.6 *** -100.7 **  -169.8 *** -139.1 ***
(41.7) (58.6) (48.0) (43.5) (57.7) (47.0)
Post-Peron 328.2 *** 323.1 *** 289.1 *** 328.7 *** 329.5 *** 293.5 ***
(39.2) (37.0) (29.7) (39.3) (35.5) (29.4)
Dictator -256.8 *** -337.7 *** -322.1 *** -258.8 *** -365.5 *** -357.2 ***
(53.4) (84.2) (74.3) (53.4) (83.9) 74.2411
End Term 15.7  37.2 *   46.0 ** 
(23.0) (21.0) (21.1)
_cons 132.5 *** 216.7 *** 233.2 *** 121.9 *** 209.2 *** 226.9 ***
(33.5) (59.1) (57.8) (39.4) (58.1) (55.7)
N 6 26 26 2 6 26 26 2
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70
TABLE 3.3  Dependent Variable: Strikes (Annual Observations). Least Squares Regression 
with Robust Standard Errors
Note: For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis, below).  * p < 0.1 ; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Variable 
a
b Length is highly collinear with pro-Labor Court, post-Peron and dictator in the cohesive 
representation of legislative parties, and was dropped from the analysis. 
Model I Model II
a All specifications include three lagged observations of the growth of GDP. 
 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
    We  started  this  paper  pointing to the scant empirical support for 
models of legislative lobbying.  We provide here a framework that 
reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available 
evidence.  The first contribution of the paper is then to show that the 
empirical work has been looking at the wrong impact of lobbying on 
policy.  Rather than affecting policy by impacting on the nature of 
legislation, lobbying may be affecting policy via judicial decisions.  Thus, 
judicial lobbying.    112
    Since interest groups cannot directly lobby justices, however, the link 
between lobbying and court rulings can only be indirect: lobbying 
influences court rulings by affecting the political constraints faced by the 
court. Identifying this mechanism allows us to reconsider the determinants 
and effectiveness of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We show 
that a key factor in determining lobbying is the extent by which the 
information so generated can sway decisive majorities in the legislature to 
tighten the political constraints faced by an anti-interest group court, or 
relax the constraints faced by a pro-interest group court.  
    Our empirical results for the interactions among unions, courts, and the 
legislature in Argentina are consistent with this description.  Argentine 
courts tend to side more with unions the more the unions strike. Unions, 
in turn, strike more when courts face a more unified legislature.  It is in 
these situations that unions’ lobbying makes the legislature more pro-
labor, triggering, then, more pro-union judicial decisions. Our paper, then, 
suggests that analyses of lobbying should pay closer attention to the 
actual nature of the policy making process, and in particular, to the 
interaction of the bureaucracy, the courts and the legislature.    113
3.5  Appendix  
Definition (Ramey 1996).  Fix a sequential equilibrium Γ, and denote the payoff 
in Γ  of a type-θ union by U(θ). Fix an off-the-equilibrium-path action a by the 
union; i.e., a ∉ γ([0,1]), and suppose there is a nonempty set X’ ⊂ X such that: for 
all θ ∉ X’ there exists θ’∈X’ such that U(a,x,θ) ≥ U(θ) implies U(a,x,θ’) > U(θ’). 
Then the equilibrium is said to violate criterion D1 unless it is the case that the 
support of F(θ|a) is included in X’. A sequential equilibrium is a D1 equilibrium if 
it does not violate criterion D1 for any a ∉ γ([0,1]). 
 
Lemma 3.1. Coupled with beliefs satisfying Bayes’ rule, the  following strategies 
constitute a sequential equilibrium: (i) court’s strategy xc(a) is defined by 
)) ( ( ) (
1 a x a x
PI
c c
− = γ  for all a such that γ 
-1(a)  ∈ K, and xc(γ
0(θ0)) = zc  , where 
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. First note that if beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule, then (i) 
for all a  such that γ 
-1(a)  ∈ K ,  f(θ|a)=1 if θ = γ 
-1(a),  and  f(θ|a) = 0 if 
θγ ≠





[() () ] θ
θ
θθ = − 10  if θ  ∈ [ θ0,θ1], and 
fa (|) θ = 0 otherwise. Hence it follows directly from proposition 1 that the 
court’s proposed strategy specifies is a best response given these beliefs.  
    It remains to show the optimality of union’s strategy given f( |a) and  
xc( ). To do so it is enough – by the revelation principle – to consider 
direct mechanisms in which every type has the incentive to make truthful 
announcements.  
    Suppose first that θ0>0. Our initial step is to show that if the 
restriction of the union strategy to [0,θ0] is given by γ
0(θ), as defined 
above, then a union of type θ  ≤  θ0 does not have the incentive to 
misrepresent its type by claiming that its type is θ’∈[0,θ0], θ’≠ θ. To see 
this, consider an arbitrary strategy  ) ( ~ θ γ  and its restriction to [0,θ0]. Truth 
telling is then optimal for θ  in this range only if: 
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    Note that the FOC for a maximum at θ can be written as:  
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    From this it follows immediately that  ) ( ~ θ γ  is strictly increasing in θ in 
[0,θ0] (the second order condition, assuring that  ) ( ~ θ γ  is incentive 
compatible across [0,θ0], follows from the assumption that Caθ(a,θ)<0. See 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998, 262). Moreover, for the functional forms 
specified, we can obtain: 



























    Note that we have made use of the fact that γ(0) = 0. For suppose not; 
that is, suppose γ(0)=a > 0, and consider a deviation by type θ=0 to 
action a = 0. Equilibrium policy following the observation of lobbying level 
a=min γ([0,1]) results in the complete information policy corresponding to 
the lower type in the distribution; i.e., xc(a) = xc(θ=0). But after a 
deviation, uninformed agents will respond with strategies that are optimal 
given some beliefs with support in [0,1]. Then policy following a deviation 
cannot possibly be worst for the union than equilibrium policy. Hence, the 
deviation is profitable for type 0, since it reduces costs but can’t adversely 
affect outcomes.   
    An identical argument shows that if θ1 < 1, a θ-type union, θ ≥ θ1, does 
not have an incentive to play γ
1(θ’’) for θ’’≠θ, θ’’∈ [θ1,1]. Furthermore, it 
follows from the previous argument that a type θ < θ0 does not have an 
incentive to play γ
P = γ
0(θ0);  i.e., every type θ  ∈ [0,θ0)  prefers   116
(γ
0(θ),zL(θ;βH)) to (γ
P,zc). Similarly, when θ1 ∈ (0,1), there is no type θ > θ1 
with an incentive to play γ
P = γ
1(θ1). We continue by showing that when 0 
<  θ0 < θ1 <1, no type in θ  ∈ [0,θ0]  has an incentive to play γ(θ’)  for 
θ’∈[θ1,1] (and the opposite). That is, we want to show that u(zL(θ;βH)) – 
C(γ
0(θ),θ) ≥ u(zL(θ’;βL)) – C(γ




1(θ1), zL(θ1;βL)), we have, for θ≤θ0:  
                    ) ), ( ( )) ; ( ( ) ), ( ( )) ; ( ( 1
1
1
0 θ θ γ β θ θ θ γ β θ C z u C z u L L H L u − ≥ −       (3.1) 
    Also, we know that θ’’≥ θ1 prefers (γ
1(θ’’), zL(θ’’;βL)) to (γ
1(θ’), zL(θ’;βL)) 
for θ’ ≥ θ1, θ’’≠ θ’, θ’’≥ θ1. In particular, with θ’’=θ1, this implies, for θ’>θ1:  




1 θ θ γ β θ θ θ γ β θ C z u C z u L L L L − ≥ −      (3.2) 
    Now by (3.2), for θ ≤ θ1,   
 
    so that for θ ≤ θ1 ≤  θ’, 
                   ) ), ( ( )) ; ( ( ) ), ' ( ( )) ; ' ( ( 1
1
1
1 θ θ γ β θ θ θ γ β θ C z u C z u L L L L − ≤ −       (3.3) 
        The result then follows from (3.1) and (3.3). In addition, (3.3) also 
shows that any type in the pool [θ0,θ1] prefers the pool than to announce 
θ’ ≥ θ1. A similar argument establishes that when 0<θ0 <θ1 <1, no type θ ∈ 
[θ1,1] has an incentive to play γ(θ’) for θ’ ∈ [0,θ0], and that no type in the 
pool prefers to announce θ’ ≤ θ0. Finally, it is easy to see that γ can have 
no discontinuities at γ
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sufficiently close to θ0 for which a deviation by θ0 would be profitable 
(involving a marginal loss in policy, but a discrete reduction in lobbying 
costs). Similarly, it can be shown that when θ1<1, γ
1(θ1)=γ
0(θ0) when θ0>0. 
That γ
1(θ1)=0 if θ0= 0, as we argued above, is covered in the claim that 
γ(0) = 0.  
Proof of Proposition 3.2. That there exists an equilibrium where (i) and (ii) 
hold follow immediately from Lemma 3.1. It remains to show that this is 
indeed the unique equilibrium satisfying criterion D1.  So let 
() ( ) a f xc |
~
, ~ , ~ ~ ⋅ ≡ Π γ  be an equilibrium satisfying criterion D1. We will show 
that if θ0>0, then  ] , 0 [ ) ( ) ( ~
0
0 θ θ θ γ θ γ ∈ ∀ = . The same argument can then be 
applied to show that if θ1 <1, then  ] 1 , [ ) ( ) ( ~
1
1 θ θ θ γ θ γ ∈ ∀ = .  
    From the proof of lemma 3.1, we only need to show that  ) ( ~ θ γ  is strictly 
increasing in [0,θ0]. So suppose that this is not the case. That is, for a>0, 
let  ) ( ~ 1 a
− Γ  denote the inverse image set of a under γ ~, and suppose that 
there exists an a
P>0 such that  ( ) { } 0
1
0 0 : ~ ~
θ θ θ ≤ ≤ Γ ∈ ≡
− P P a X  is not a singleton. 
Since γ ~ must be monotonically (weakly) increasing, 
P X0
~  must then be an 
interval  [θ ,θ ]  ⊆ [0,θ0]. Let  ( ) L L a f x β ); | (
~
⋅ , and  ( ) H L a f x β ); | (
~
⋅  denote the 
preferred policies of the critical legislators  L β and  H β given beliefs  ) | (
~
a f ⋅ . 
As in the case with complete information, we can now show that the set of 
stable policies is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) )) ( ), ( ( ); | (
~
, ); | (
~
) | (
~ a s a s a f x a f x S H L L L a f ≡ ⋅ ⋅ =
⋅ β β . But   118
if 
P X0
~  = [θ ,θ ] ⊆ [0,θ0], then Bayes’ rule and the full support assumption 
imply that  0 ) | (
~
>
P a f θ  for every θ∈[θ ,θ ] and  0 ) | (
~
=
P a f θ  otherwise. This 
in turn implies that  ) ; ( ) ( ) ; ( H L
P
H L z a s z β θ β θ < < . And since 
() h z H c β θ θ − = ≤ 0 , then  ( ) c H L z z < β θ; . Thus the constraint is binding for 
the court, and  ( ) ( )
P P
c a s a x = ~ . Next, choose θ < θ  sufficiently close to θ  so 
that  ( ) () H L
P z a s β θ; < . Since by assumption Caθ <0, the slope of a union’s 
indifference curve in the (a,x) space is decreasing in the type θ, and we can 
always find a pair (a*,xc*) such that  ) ), ( , ( ) *, *, ( θ θ
P P
c a s a U x a U >  (1), and for 




), ( , ( )
~
*, *, ( θ θ θ θ ≤ ∀ <
P P
c a s a U x a U  (2).  Furthermore, we can as 
well find one such pair for xc* < zL(θ;βH). Suppose first that  ) ~ (γ range a∈ . 
Since  γ ~ is an equilibrium, this implies that  * *) ( ~
c c x a x <  (IC for θ).  But 




( ~ a . Then supp{ *) | (
~
a f ⋅ }  ⊂ [ θ,θ ]  and 
hence  ) ; ( *) ( ~
H L c z a x β θ ≥ , which is a contradiction.  Now suppose instead 
that  ) ~ (γ range a∉ . Then if  )
~
), ( , ( )
~
, *, ( θ θ
P P
c a s a U x a U ≥  for  θ θ ≤
~ , (2) implies 
that xc > xc*, so that, by (1),  ) ), ( , ( ) , *, ( θ θ
P P
c a s a U x a U > . Thus criterion D1 
requires supp{ *) | (
~
a f θ } ⊆ [θ,θ ]. But in this case type θ has an incentive to 
deviate from the proposed equilibrium behavior. 
Q.E.D.   119
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